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INTRODUCTION

Traditional Erie' is like a false front on a movie set, with few seeing the unfinished rear side. That other side represents the extent of
federal law applicable in state courts, which the legal system determines under a doctrine called reverse-Erie2 (or occasionally by academics "converse-Erie"3 or "inverse-Erie" 4). While everyone has an Erie
theory and stands ready to debate it, almost no one has a theory of
reverse-Erie, and no one at all has developed a clear choice-of-law
methodology for it: reverse-Erie, often misunderstood, mischaracterized, and misapplied by judges and commentators, goes strangely ig5
nored by most scholars.
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 The term seems to have first appeared in commentary and case law through
off-handed usages by William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 34 (1963), and American UniversalInsurance Co. v. Chauvin, 329 F.2d 174, 179
(5th Cir. 1964) ("Nothing we here do or say is intended as even a gentle reverse-Erie
breeze to the contrary."); cf. infra note 104 (earlier similar usage).
3

E.g., RICHARD L. MARcus, MARTIN H. REDtSH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CML PRO-

CEDURE 1002 (4th ed. 2005).

4 E.g., Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49
U. PIr. L. REv. 937, 941 n.10, 963 n.76 (1988).
5 Remarkably little has been written on the doctrine (and, as one of my students
pointed out tactfully, Googling "reverse-Eie" reveals little of significance besides this
Article), The earliest article on the subject is the prescient one by Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedurein State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem? 17 OHIo ST.
L.J. 384 (1956). Professor Hill detected and generalized the emergent doctrine, link-
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Beyond eagerly theorizing about Erie, nearly everyone acknowledges its central importance. 6 They see its classic judicial choice-oflaw7 progeny as essential to understanding the bigger issue of the law
applicable in federal court regardless of the governmental institution
that chose the law, which issue in turn leads to the most general probing and analogizing it to the Erie line of cases while noting significant differences that
argued for both a more intrusive and a less intrusive doctrine than Erie. Id. at 411-15.
But as to reverse-Erie methodology, he was hindered by the fact that he was writing in
the heyday of outcome-determinative analysis. The most recent article is the insightful one by AnthonyJ. BelliaJr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 825 (2005). Professor Belliajustified the authority of state courts to
"make" federal common law, as long as they do so in accordance with existing federal
law. Id. at 886-88. But his concern was with the constitutional authority of states to
make any federal law, rather than with the methodology for deciding when federal
law governs in state court. Id. at 901-09. Between those two articles came the following useful works, which built in their understanding: Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551, 1557-61 (1960) (arguing in favor of a nonintrusive reverse-Erie approach equivalent to the then prevailing Erie interest balancing);
Samuel S. Wilson, Note, ProceduralProtectionfor FederalRights in State Courts, 30 U. CIN.
L. REV. 184, 188-89 (1961) (distinguishing reverse-Erie, Erie, and horizontal conflicts
settings); Burt Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 725, 747-48, 766-77 (1981)
(re-equating reverse-Erie and Erie
problems); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784-96 (1992) (linking reverse-Erie to preemption); Martin H.
Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, FederalPower to Commandeer State Courts: Implicationsfor the
Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71, 99-108 (1998) (arguing for a rigid
approach to reverse-Erie, with an intrusive role for federal law), critiqued by Vicki C.
Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructureof Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REv. 111,
131, 136-40 (1998) (favoring an unspecified but less intrusive balancing approach).
6 "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision." CHARLvs
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 378 (6th ed. 2002).
While that quotation must be an overstatement in itself, cf Kevin M. Clermont, Foreword to Kuo-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAw, at ix, xviii n.50
(2003) (discussing other kinds of self-contradictory statements), it is not far off from
representativeness or from accuracy.
7 The Erie situation involves a "choice of law" in the sense that the federal authority is deciding whether federal law should be generated to apply to a given issue
or state law should be left to govern. The decision on this "vertical" choice of law is
often reached by a process similar to that employed in the more traditional "horizontal" choice of law. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts
Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1235, 1255-63 (1999); Martin
H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westin and Lehman, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 959, 960-62 (1980). Indeed, some have found in traditional conflict-of-laws doctrine the answer both to reverse-Erie, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1753-54 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause calls for federal law to prevail in all cases of so-called
actual conflicts), and to preemption, e.g., Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional
Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 181, 230-31 (2004) (suggesting a more
nuanced use of comparative impairment analysis).
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lem of the appropriate relationship between state and federal law
throughout the legal system. For some judges and commentators,
"Erid' connotes only the courts' choice-of-law methodology," but for
others, and for this Article, the name connotes as well these broader
topics of state and federal laws' interplay. 9 That is, judicial choice of
law is just one corner of the whole, even if it is the corner that has
generated the greatest interest and provided the greatest explanatory
force. Its classic cases-difficult cases in diversity that primarily concerned the law governing quasi-procedural issues on which the Constitution and Congress were silent-are uniquely informing as to the
megadoctrine on the governing law in a system of federalism.1 0
Reverse-Erie occupies the opposite side of the federalism coin
from that occupied by the classic Erie cases. In state court, when does
state law apply and when does federal law apply? By this formulation,
reverse-Erie poses a question that is very similar to the Erie questionalthough tantalizingly, it does not have an identical answer, as we shall
see. It also seems to pose a question at least as important as Erie-and
in fact numerically far more significant because, as everybody knows,
the volume of business in state courts dwarfs that in federal courts,
and federal law covers a wide array of litigation-producing activities
that end up in state court. Consequently, the denigrated or ignored
reverse-Erie doctrine appears to be, on its own, both a potentially instructive and an undeniably important feature of the fundamental relationship of state and federal law.
This Article contends that reverse-Erie does indeed hold the key
to understanding the major problem ubiquitously encountered in our
system: the choice between state and federal law. This Article will
eventually build to the contention that every actor, public or private,
who faces a legal question in a federal system must first resolve this
question of vertical choice of law. Therefore, at the least, one cannot
fully understand the overall relationship of state and federal law if the
reverse-Erie piece of the puzzle is missing (to be mercilessly unfaithful
to metaphor). Arguably, one cannot truly understand even the Erie
side alone if one ignores the reverse-Erie doctrine.
This Article accordingly tries, in Part I, to unearth the reverse-Erie
doctrine by developing a theory and methodology. Then it will more
8 See, e.g., Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying
Erie choice-of-law analysis in a diversity action); Bauer, supranote 7, at 1236 (analogizing Erie to traditional choice of law).
9 See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 5, at 901-09.
10 See, e.g.,
Bauer, supra note 7, at 1243-63 (describing the process by which
courts applying Erie identify and resolve conflicts between state and federal law).
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briefly try, in Part II, to explain the overlooked significance of this
subject.
I.

DOCTRINE

By reverse-Erie, federal law flows down to govern in state court.
Under currently expressed views of the doctrine, however, it does so
12
by uncertain means and to an uncertain extent.
To get more of a handle on reverse-Erie as a matter of judicial
choice of law, analysts most often start from preemption.13 They do so
because it is the most closely related doctrine in the task of determining the reach of federal law. t4 It is in some senses the more important
doctrine, with big consequences in both federal and state litigation as
well as out in the real world.
Preemption, in brief, is an ill-bounded constitutional doctrine
that invalidates state law if it interferes with federal law.' 5 Although
preemption tends to focus on displacement of state substantive law by
11 See, e.g., Mack v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 838 N.E.2d 80, 87 (I1. App. Ct.
2005), appeal denied, 850 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. 2006).
12 See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Maritime Litigation in State Court, 55
LA. L. REv. 685, 700 (1995) (noting the inconsistency in Supreme Court pronouncements on the question of whether state courts must apply federal or state law in maritime cases).
13 E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5 (4th ed. 2003); Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1785-86. But cf. infra note 207 (noting other doctrines that
federal courts scholars use as points of departure for approaching reverse-Erie).
14 Preemption in turn bumps up against the constitutional doctrines of "federalism" that limit federal powers to certain spheres or that invoke the Tenth Amendment to prohibit exercise of those federal powers in certain ways impinging on the
states' sovereignty. See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is 13-48 (2004). Compare David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of FederalPreemptionJurisprudence:A QuantitativeAnalysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) ("For most
judges, whether liberal or conservative, these cases pit one dimension of their ideology, their principles of federalism, against another, their policy preferences or attitudes toward the particular local regulation at issue."), and Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,83 TEx. L. REX'. 1, 130-34 (2004) (arguing to resolve

the tension between preemption and federalism in favor of state autonomy by limiting preemption), with Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the Federalism Five, 37 RuTGERS
L.J. 1, 26-28 (2005) (reconciling the tension between preemption and federalism

principles).
15

See ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW § 5.2 (3d ed. 2006); CHRISTO-

89-125 (Jack Stark ed., 2004). A similar
analysis applies in determining when a federal statute, such as a securities act, repeals
a prior federal statute, such as an antitrust act. See, e.g., Billing v. Credit Suisse First
Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2005); cf Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The
Powers That Be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts' Rulemaking and Adjudicatory Powers
in the Context of a Clash of a CongressionalStatute and a Supreme Court Rule, 57 BAYLOR L.
PHER R. DRAIIoZAL, THE Supp.EmAcv CLAUSE
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recognize that it can
congressional statute, judges and commentators
6
that it can occur by federal
displace state procedural law too,' and
17
by the effect of federal common law.',
administrative act or even
1 9 or implied; and implied preemption can
Preemption can be express
conconflicts by discrimination against or 2
trump a state provision that
20
an obstacle to federal law,22' or
tradiction to federal law or stands as
exclusively a whole field, alcan authorize federal law to occupy are blurry. 23
categories
though of course all these
between
the federal courts' analysis of conflicts
REV. 587, 606-15 (2005) (assessing
statutes).
rules that incorporate state law and
process);
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) (due
Constr.
Chem.
v.
16 See Kremer
L.J. 947,
YALE
110
Procedures,
Court
State
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of
959-62 (2001).
(1962); DRAHOzAL, supra note 15, at 95.
17 See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666-70
376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964); Local 174,
18 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
note
95, 102-04 (1962); WRIGHT & KANE, supra
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
99
Law,
Common
Federal
of
Scope
of Law: The
6, § 45, at 294; Martha A. Field, Sources
Federal
of
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers
HARv. L. REV. 881, 897 (1986); Thomas
Courts, 52 U. CiI. L. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
Liggett
U.S. 470, 484 (1996); Cipollone v.
19 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
of State
Preemption
Stabile,
J.
Compare Susan
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-24 (1992).
88-90
2-4,
1,
REv.
L.
VILL.
40
or the Courts?,
Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress
should
courts
that
and
wise
not
are
provisions
(1995) (arguing that express statutory
of
analysis), with Bradford R. Clark, Separation
preemption
in
role
active
more
the
play
that
(arguing
(2001)
L. REv. 1321, 1427-29
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,79 TEX.
preemptive statute).
clearly
a
from
only
follow
preemption should
in
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (saying
20 See Barnett Bank of Marion County
on
duties
conflicting
directly
"impose
laws
if
dicta that state law would be preempted
must sell
example, if the federal law said, 'you
for
would,
they
banks-as
national
not'"); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
insurance,' while the state law said, 'you may
(saying that state law would be preempted
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
and state regulations is a physical
federal
both
with
"where compliance
impossibility").
(saying that state law would be preempted
21 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31
that the
national banks to engage in activities
where "the Federal Statute authorizes
(saying
(1941)
67
52,
U.S.
312
v. Davidowitz,
State Statute expressly forbids"); Hines
accomplishthe
to
obstacle
an
as
"stands
it
that state law would be preempted where
and objectives of Congress").
ment and execution of the full purposes
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
Energy
22 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
law would be preempted when "the Federal
U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (saying that state
Rice
field or an identifiable portion of it");
Government completely occupies a given
regulafederal
of
scheme
("The
(1947)
230
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
left no
reasonable the inference that Congress
tion may be so pervasive as to make
in
field
a
touch
may
Or the Act of Congress
room for the States to supplement it.
to
assumed
be
will
system
federal
the
that
which the federal interest is so dominant
the same subject." (citations omitted)).
preclude enforcement of state laws on
529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000).
Co.,
23 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
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In exploring preemption, as one gets into implied preemption by
conflict and turns toward possible preemption of state procedural law
otherwise applicable in state court, one encounters the classic reverseErie cases, which books often treat as sui generis under some heading
like "State Court Procedures and Federal Law Claims." 24 As one

pushes further into judicial decisions that on their own federalize
some point of law for state courts, without any semblance of a search
for actual congressional intent, one starts to see the wider application
of reverse-Erie. 2,5 Then, when one perceives complementary methodologies at work in these two realms of implied preemption and judicial choice of law, one should start to sense the significance of reverseErie.
Nevertheless, many commentators end up considering reverseErie to amount to nothing more than preemption. 26 Their view has
wide consequences. Because preemption most often involves only displacement of state substantive law by interpretation of congressional
legislation, these commentators tend to think predominantly in those
terms. 27 Moreover, quotes abound in the case law about preemption
24
25
2005)
26

§ 3.5.

DRAiozAL, supra note 15, at 84.
See, e.g., Mack v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 838 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ill. App. Ct.
(applying federal maritime law), appeal denied, 850 N.E.2d 808 (I1. 2006).
E.g., Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1785-86; see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13,

27 See, e.g., DRA-tozAL, supranote 15, at 90; Davis, supra note 7, at 198-200; Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000) [hereinafter Nelson, Preemption].
For an example of the flawed consequences of this approach, Professor Nelson centrally argues that, under his view, federal law can implicitly preempt no more than
state law that logically contradicts the federal law, and not state law that merely frustrates the federal law, id. at 260-64; accordingly, he concludes that, in the absence of
an explicitly preemptive statute, the current doctrine of obstacle preemption byjudicial construction lies beyond the proper reach of the Supremacy Clause and preemption. Id. at 265-90. His position, however, could make sense only in a legal system
with no judicial lawmaking. Imagine a point of law that obstacle preemption would
currently federalize but that he would leave to state law in state court. When that
point arises in a federal action, an Erieanalysis would almost always lead to creation of
federal common law, because here the implied-preemption and federal-common-law
doctrines overlap and because the latter would encounter no limitation comparable
to his restriction on obstacle preemption. Once that federal common law definitely
exists, it would henceforth displace the state law in state court, because the state law
now squarely contradicts the federal common law. See supra text accompanying note
18. Indeed, reverse-Erie would have obligated the state courts to anticipate the existence of federal common law, and so displaced state law from the start. See infra text
accompanying note 144. Therefore, obstacle preemption would reappear through
the back door, leaving little or no reason to barricade the front door. CompareClark,
supra note 19, at 1452-57 (necessarily coupling a view that would severely restrict
federal common law to a somewhat similar attack on obstacle preemption), with Ca-
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viewed on a background of a prebeing narrowly limited, and often
28 Thus, broad thoughts about reversesumption against preemption.
Erie languish.
sense something in reverseOther commentators, some of whom
study it when focusing on the proErie that goes beyond preemption,
substantive context and sometimes
cedure to govern in a particular
mind.2 9 They tend to create exotic
with a substantive result already in
federal procedure should trump
doctrine for special occasions when
issues. 30
federal-law
of
litigation
court
state procedure during state
view of any of these commenReverse-Erie in fact is more than the
of their views. The fact is
tators, and indeed more than a combination
state court procedures and
that many cases, such as those involving
law in state court in circumstances
federal-law claims, apply federal 3 1
What is the applicable doctrine
that preemption does not reach.
at its actual content and possible
that produces this result? To get
the beginning is necessary. Acsignificance, renewing analysis from
the overall relationship of state
cordingly, I propose to launch into
court. This broad reconception of
and federal law applicable in state
and judicial choice of
reverse-Erie thus subsumes both 3preemption
2 After so generalizing the subject,
law, while each informs the other.
(2006)
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 558-59
leb Nelson, The Persistence of General
conceding
apparendy
hence
common law and
(maintaining a robust role for federal
preemption).
a proper role for obstacle
v. Liggett
518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996); Cipollone
28 E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
U.S. 218,
331
Corp.,
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992);
230-31 (1947); see infra note 154.
lIARv. L. REV.
Court Forfeitures of FederalRights, 99
29 E.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State
docstate ground and federal habeas corpus
1128, 1132 (1986) (studying inadequate
defaults
procedural
federal doctrine excusing
trines "to establish a broad and flexible
law
and explaining that this common
issues,"
federal
by state court litigants raising
5, at 787
note
supra
Neuborne,
courts);
and federal
doctrine would apply in both state
rules governing
and hospitable body of collateral
uniform
a
establish
(seeking "to
facilitate civil
to
order
and federal court" in
constitutional litigation in both state
rights enforcement).
of federal
at 1190 (discussing the application
30 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 29,
of a federal
forfeiture
court
state
a
of
standards "to determine the appropriateness
claim in a criminal case").
15, at 84-86 (discussing case law).
31 See, e.g., DF.AHOZAL, supra note
2097-2112
Law of Preemption,88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
32 See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the
presumption
against the existence of any general
(2000). This fine article argues
from exand then describes a spectrum running
against preemption, id. at 2092-97,
comfederal
to
preemption
field
obstacle, and
press preemption through conflict,
that
so
Clause analysis
mon law and dormant Commerce
and
not be analyzed as conceptually discrete
should
preemption
the law of
a
of
part
as
be properly assessed only
distinctive doctrines, but rather can
law.
state
displaces
whereby federal law
spectrum of interrelated mechanisms
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and largely unquestionable
I shall divide it up by using the familiar
of the Framers,
framework of the differing institutional competencies
will make doctrinal labels such
Congress, and courts. Such an analysis
of law fade into the background.
as preemption and judicial choice
and subdividing vertical choice
However, before so generalizing
of the law applicable in federal court
of law in state court, the subject
into Erie will set the stage by
deserves a few words. This brief detour
frame the general problem,
stating the institutional competencies that
relevant to the subsequent discuswhile going into detail only where
the critical point that agreement
sion of reverse-Erie. It will also make
particular methodology for resolving
between reader and author on a
for following or even acspecific Erie questions is not a prerequisite
of reverse-Erie.
cepting this Article's discussion
A.

Law Applicable in Federal Court

is a major doctrine that helps
As already suggested, preemption
law for actions litigated in federal
in determining the reach of federal
coexists with a ballyhooed choicecourt. But the preemption doctrine
coexistence have stimulated little
of-law doctrine. The details of this
they fixate in casebook and com33
attention among scholars. Instead,
concerns judicial choice of law.
that
Erie
of
part
the
on
mentary
picture of federalism, one must
To understand as a whole the big
including the constitutional
first reconsider the institutional structure,
34
The federal
judicial choice of law.
and congressional powers to limit
law by its
federal
between state and
government may make the choice
the Federal Constitution, Congress
ordinary hierarchy of lawmakers:
If
delegate), or the federal courts.
(or its authorized administrative
or impliedly made the choice
the Constitution or Congress expressly
statutory preemption doctrines but
The spectrum includes not only the core
even without any relevant
displaced
is
also mechanisms whereby state law
congressional action.
the same
decisional process as being basically
Id. at 2097. Professor Dinh sees the
being
region
law
common
the
difference as one enters
across this spectrum, with the
id. at 2109,
role,"
common-law
a
by
replaced
been
has
action
"that the legislative
on "strong
law if the federal common law rests
which will preempt inconsistent state
in the dorbalancing
at
2112. Although he hints
or uniquely federal interests," id. at
to
attention
separate
give
not
2111, he does
mant Commerce Clause realm, id. at
as govsubject
whole
the
treats
rather
but
judicial choice of law under reverse-Erie,
law. Id.
on displacement of inconsistent state
focused
analysis
preemption
a
by
erned
at 2097-98.
dis6, § 55 (presenting an excellent Erie
33 See, e.g., WRIGHT & KANE, supra note
between federal and state law).
cussion mainly focused on judicial choice
(C)
OF CrIL PROCEDURE § 3.2(A),
PRINCIPLES
34 See generally KEviN M. CLERMONT,
summary).
Erie
for the following abbreviated
(2005) (providing additional citations
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10

35 Only in the
federal courts.
of law, that choice is binding on the
congressional directive36must the
absence of such a constitutional or
In fact,
state or federal law applies.
federal courts decide whether
federal
in
law
judicial choice of
then, this latter situation involving
now
shall
the big picture, which I
actions represents a small part of
sketch.

of Powers
1. First, Mostly Considering Separation
of much supreme federal
In addition to authorizing the making
have dictated many choices that fedlaw, the Constitution could itself
in federal court, and of course these
eral law govern particular 3points
7
example is the Seventh Amendment's
choices would be binding. An
jury right directly governs
guarantee of trial by jury: the constitutional state court cases.38 Most
not in
in all federal court cases, although
not so dictate that federal law
did
often, however, the Constitution
apply.
federal law, the ConstituWhere the Constitution did not choose
the federal authorities from choostion might have instead prohibited
law. That is, the Constitution could
ing to apply too much federal
in establishing the limited federal
choose state law, as it generally did
39

government.
the Constitution did not
In many circumstances, however,
in
make a valid choice by statute
choose, leaving Congress able to
conis, within the just-described
favor of federal law or state law. That
or
extremes, Congress can expressly
stitutional limits lying at the two
federal and state law for actions
impliedly make the choice of law between will bind the federal courts. 4 0
and its choice
litigated in federal court,
law, the only vertical choice-of-law
If Congress chooses the applicable
is whether that choice was constituquestion remaining for the courts

35

Id. § 3.2(A), at 139.

36
37
38

Id.
Id.
Id.

doctrine of lim15, § 3.1, at 234 (explaining the
39 See CHEMERJNSKV, supra note
ited federal legislative authority).
some pre302 (legislating that state law governs
law
40 Compare, e.g., FED. R. Evin.
federal
that
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (legislating
Evisumptions in federal court), with,
The
of subsequent remedial measures).
governs admissibility in federal court
statute, provide a nice source for comparafederal
a
dence Rules, which were actually
ble examples throughout this section.
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tionally valid, because the Constitution imposes the only bounds on
41
the congressional power.
If Congress chooses federal law, and hence to preempt state law,
it usually specifies the content of that federal law,42 although it sometimes delegates to the federal courts the task of generating part or all
of that federal law. 43 It is important to keep clear this distinction between choosing the applicable law and specifying its content.
Here, finally, is the main point: only in the absence of both a
constitutional and a congressional directive can the federal courts validly choose to apply federal or state law. As already observed, this
court-drawn boundary is what many people narrowly term to be the
44
Erie question.
All the institutional actors are of interest here. But maximal exposure of the choice process, in its systematic and rational form,
comes when we examine how federal courts choose between state and
federal law, for application to a particular issue in a case, in those
circumstances where the federal courts are free under the Constitution and federal legislation to go either way. Judicial choice, therefore, does merit the special attention it receives. So, when neither the
Constitution nor Congress has determined the law applicable to a new
situation-when neither has spoken on choice of law, and also when
the federal courts have not formerly settled the question-how can
and should a federal court exercise its residual choice-of-law power?
2.

Next, Mostly Considering Federalism

The federal court is not determining whether pre-existing federal
law already covers the question, because if the law did, the court would
not be dealing with a situation of silence by the lawmakers above the
court in the lawmaking hierarchy. Instead, the court must look at federalism policies somehow to decide if federal law should govern. If so,
and because that federal law does not already exist, the court then
must create the federal law, most often by analogy or adoption. That
is, once the court chooses federal law, it must extend federal law by
creating specialized federal common law, which thereafter exists and
45
applies by stare decisis.
41 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
42 E.g., FED. R. Evmn. 601 (competency).
43 E.g., FED. R. Evi. 501 (privilege).
44 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
45 For a synopsis of the Erie doctrine's application to federal common law, see
WRic,-T & KANE, supra note 6, § 60.
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It is useful to recognize that the courts' choice-of-law power therefore equates to a lawmaking power. The outer boundary on the federal
courts' power to choose on their own to apply federal law is equivalent
to a judicial lawmaking power because, whenever the federal courts so
choose to apply federal law, they are extending, and hence making,
4
federal law.

6

Incidentally, Congress's powers to choose and make federal law
likewise equate. 4 7 The same constitutional limit applies to both con48
gressional powers.
Accordingly, the federal legislature and also (when that legislature is silent) the federal courts can choose and make federal law,
subject to their respective constitutional limit. Those limits, rooted in
federalism, permit significant lawmaking activity by the federal government. Yet limits must have some teeth, however stubby. Because
the Erie Court treated the limit on judicial power, but not the limit on
congressional power, 49 the relation between the two limits remains
unstated authoritatively. Nonetheless, it would seem that the boundary demarcating constitutionally permissible matters for the federal
courts to reach with federal common law is more restrictive than the
boundary applicable to federal legislators.5 0 The lawmaking function
of Congress to create federal law for application in federal court is
thus more expansive, permitting greater intrusion into matters of
state interest. Congress may validly opt for federal law more often
than the federal courts can, because under our constitutional structure Congress should be the more active articulator of federal interests, while the courts must steer clear of blatantly formulating policies.
We need not pin down precisely those constitutional limits. In
federal court today, state law will apply in many situations where such
application is not constitutionally compelled-that is, where the federal authorities could make federal law-because the federal government defers to state law by declining as a matter of comity to exercise
the full extent of its constitutional powers. 5 1 Congress and the federal
courts could resolve any doubts in the hard cases under current doc46 See id. § 60, at 414-15.
47 Taking into account the peculiarities of treaty-making would require greater
verbal precision, but would end similarly. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
434-35 (1920).
48 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967).
49 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
50 See Paul J. Mishkin, Comment, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87
HARV. L. Rfv. 1682, 1683 (1974).
51 CLERMONT, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 143.
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52
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courts' Erie approach, although of
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courts choose?
the courts. So, again, how do the
Methodology
Finally, Specifying a Judicial Choice-of-Law
Court, with the lower federal
Since the beginning, the Supreme
a sequence of choice-of-law
courts in tow, has progressed through
the Erie problem as a matter of
techniques for judicially handling
if a Federal Rule covers the matter,
comity. Today, federal law prevails
53
for the rest of law, the Court has
according to Hanna v. Plumer. But
or optimal solution.
not yet arrived at any truly clear
this step in the
Indeed, the variety of views is staggering-on
of judicial methodology, as opdescription of Erie, which is the step of institutional competencies. 54
posed to the foregoing description
Erie and came away shocked. The
Some time ago I went to a talk on
I
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shock was that I basically agreed
I
which
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Erie, but so little
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Id. § 3.2, at 144.
the manner of
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53 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)
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54 See Bauer,
supra
law);
common
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Anyway, for its illustrative worth, my view is that the courts do
evaluate (1) the state's interests, in light of all legitimate purposes or
policies reflected by the content of its law, in having its legal rule applied in federal court on this particular issue, in order to see if they
equal or outweigh the net sum of (2) the federal interests in having
federal law govern, which are called affirmative countervailing considerations, and (3) the negative federal interest in avoiding the forumshopping and inequality effects of any outcome-determinative difference between state and federal law. This balance thus calls for application of the law of the sovereign whose functions would be more
impaired by nonapplication.
Balancing here means the contextualized exercise ofjudgment in
the face of competing interests. 55 Admittedly, there can be an emptiness in principles that call for balancing, such as a principle saying
that the distribution of powers to federal and state governments must
be kept in balance. 5 6 But balancing can be an intelligible standard of
decision that avoids ad hocism, as long as it contains comprehensible
content for conceptualizing and resolving conflicts. The Erie balance
is not an empty metaphor and is instead an intelligible standard for
choice of law, even if malleable in application, because it provides a
"specification" of interests to put on the scales for weighing and then
prescribes a "criterion" in terms of the resulting position of the scales
57
for reaching an outcome.
Although today's Erie balance proceeds specific issue by specific
issue in any one case, this feature did not always appear inevitable.
The case law until recently seemed to have used balancing instead to
create a series of fairly general rules that soundly made the choice
between state and federal law for all the common subjects, and then
woodenly applied these general rules that allocated one subject to federal law and another subject to state law and so on. For two examples,
federal law governed if a Federal Rule was on point,5 8 while state law
55 SeeJackson, supra note 5, at 136-40.
56 See Robert Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REv. 93, 109 (2004)
("This Article shows that conceptualizing 'federalism as balance' relies on only an
unanalyzed, unexplicated, intuitive sense of balance totally devoid of even minimal
precision and lucidity for the purposes of describing, explaining, and justifying
federalism.").

57 See id. at 103-05, 124, 164.
58 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. To give a flavor of the debates here, on a point that
will become relevant later in this Article, I would maintain that in Hannait was judicial choice of law, rather than implied congressional command, that decided the
case-despite the fact that Professor Ely's revered article argued to the contrary. See
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 693, 698, 718-38 (1974).
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governed horizontal choice of law. 5 9 The courts created this series of
general rules by a sophisticated interest-balancing approach that resolved the vertical choice-of-law problem for a broad enclave of the
law. 60 The courts then relied on a tough stare decisis attitude to prevent the resultant general rule from later being eaten up by exceptions in appealing cases. 6' The long-term product of this method
would have been an extensive series of fairly workable and predictable
general rules that, when laid end-to-end, approximated the line between state and federal law ideally mandated by the goals of Erie.
62
Most recently, however, Gasperini v. Centerfor Humanities, Inc.,
undercut any such sort of "generic balancing," or "sensitive rulemaking," approach. In that diversity case the Court uttered its last major
words on Erie, although it neglected to make them clear words. It left
much to inference, but the Court at least held, first, that in the federal
district court, New York's tort reform interests called for applying the
state's aggressive new-trial standard for setting aside ajury verdict, but,
second, that federal interests still counted enough to call for applying
the deferential federal standard of appellate review in the federal
court of appeals.6 3 Most significantly, the holdings reimposed a casespecific and issue-specific approach to balancing. First, the Court surprisingly decided to apply state law to the district judge's scrutiny of
the jury decision, 64 a matter lying in the heartland of the judge-jury
relationship that had seemingly been confided to federal law by Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative.65 On that issue, the Gasperini
Court must have weighed the very specific state and federal interests
at stake on a case-by-case basis, leaving little room for stare decisis to
operate: only this kind of approach would have allowed federal judgejury law to prevail over South Carolina's weak interests in Byrd, while
subjugating it to New York's stronger tort reform interests in Gasperini. Second, as Gasperini's different result on the appellate issue
exceeds the authorization of the REA and clashes particularly with Congress's intent
to determine the Rules' reach by the REA's second sentence limiting substantive effect. Finally, because the Erie doctrine did not reach into true procedure until after
Ragan in 1949, one could argue that this reach of Erie, even if it is a "law" that "conflicts" with the Rules, was a later creation not affected by the REA's repeal provision.
59 See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975); Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
60 See, e.g.,
supra note 58.
61 See, e.g., Day & Zimmerman, 423 U.S. at 4.
62 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
63 Id. at 436-38.
64 Id. at 426-31.
65 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) (applying federal law to provide that the jury should
decide a certain factual issue).
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proved, the Court balanced interests issue-by-issue 66 : only this kind of
approach would have allowed the compromise of applying state law
on one of the Erie issues in a case, while federal law governed another.
In sum, my view is that the Supreme Court is currently committed
to specific interest balancing. But, I stress, it is not essential to the rest
of this Article that the reader share my view on judicial methodology.
a.

Resultant Realms of State and Federal Law

So, the law on Erie today is that the Constitution or Congress can
make a binding choice of law, and also that federal law prevails if a
Federal Rule covers the matter. Beyond those clear situations, the
choice of law is left to the federal courts, to be performed by one
methodology or another.
Nevertheless, the persisting dispute over judicial methodology
does not in fact leave the question of governing law terribly unclear.
In federal court today, state law will routinely apply in many situations.
And, under any conceivable methodology, federal law very often applies in federal question cases and often even in diversity cases, as a
consequence either of a constitutional or congressional choice or of
an already decided or relatively predictable judicial choice-of-law decision. The lack of clarity on vertical choice of law extends only to a
relatively small group of hard cases, and therein lies the explanation
67
of how our system can live with the lack of clarity.
A prime example of a hard case lay in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,68 where the Court chose federal law, perhaps questionably, and
then created federal law to govern rights and duties of the United
States on its commercial paper.6 9 More generally, when will the federal courts on their own choose federal law and so displace state law?
This problem, sometimes called the " Clearfield problem,"70 is no more
than a restatement of the Erie problem described above. If the judicial choice-of-law methodology developed under Erie ends up pointing to federal law rather than state law, then the federal courts will
choose federal law: besides Clearfield, examples range from the normal
filling of federal statutory interstices to inferring a private cause of
66 Ga-perini, 518 U.S. at 431-36.
67 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, § 59.
68 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (treating effect of the United States' delay in notifying
check's endorser of forgery).
69 Id. at 366--69.
70 E.g., Arthur D. Heilman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judicialy Act
of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1711, 1764 (1978) (footnote
omitted).

NOTRE

action from a federal statute

DAME

.7 1

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:1

Crudely put, the result of this judicial
72
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common law ends up with this
as in Clearfield. Thus, the federal
rules of decision whose content
vague definition: the body of federal
or statfrom interpreting federal constitutional
did not come directly
76
utory provisions.
that content of federal
In performing the task of formulating
purely create common law or
common law, federal courts sometimes
closely related or analogous federal
more often simply extend some
77 But most often federal courts opt to adopt as
statutory provision.
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441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (inferring
71 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
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cause of action in a Title IX case);
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448, 456-57 (1957) (filling big gaps
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376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
Sabbatino,
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72 Banco Nacional
451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes
Inc.,
73 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
omitted).
HART &
J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
74 See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL
[hereSYSTEM 695 (5th ed. 2003)
COURTS AND T14E FEDERAL
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inafter HART & WECHSLERI.
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
75 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
76 See Bellia, supra note 5, at 832-33.
& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-47
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
77 See, e.g.,
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to Clayton Act's four-year limitations
(1987) (subjecting civil RICO action
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federal law on the point in issue the appropriate state's law, which is
already formulated (although it may vary from state to state).78
Adoption of state law is the dominant process because it is a simple route to take, tends to reduce the federal courts' involvement in
lawmaking, and might also serve to accommodate any state interests
that may be at risk (but of insufficient weight to require application of
state law under Erie). Indeed, whenever unformulated federal law is
to govern, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of adopting state
law as the federal common law. 79 That is, federal courts should so
adopt state law, unless there is a relatively significant federal interest
in uniformity of the federal law throughout the nation or there are
relatively important federal interests calling for a particular content to
the federal law or for particular limits on the content. 80
Such optional adoption of state law as the federal common law is
distinguishable from the binding application of state law in federal
court under Erie in two big ways already intimated. First, when adopting a state's law, federal courts can adopt the appropriate state's law,
rather than the law that the forum state would apply. 8 ' Second, federal courts can reject state law that impinges on those federal interests
calling for a certain content to or limits on the common law, so that a
78 See, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989) (holding that in the absence
of a federal statute of limitations for a federally created claim, federal courts ordinarily should adopt the basic aspects of the forum state's statute of limitations for the
most closely analogous general type of state cause of action). But cf 28 U.S.C. § 1658
(2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing, beginning in 1990, a limitations period for future
federal enactments); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (holding § 1658 to be applicable if the claim was made possible by a post-1990 statutory
amendment). See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Brian E. Pastuszenski & Mark E.
Greenwald, Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized FederalCommon Law: FederalRights
of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011, 1043-49 (1980)
(describing the justifications supporting the federal courts' presumption to absorb
state limitations periods).
79 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979) (holding that
in the absence of a federal statute treating priority of liens in connection with federal
loans, federal courts should adopt the priority scheme of the appropriate state as long
as that scheme is nondiscriminatory).
80 Reassuringly, in this decision whether to adopt state law as federal law, the
arguments in favor of formulating a federal content are similar to those that we shall
see in the reverse-Erie scheme: affirmative countervailing considerations in favor of a
federal content and an outcome-determinative factor representing the interest in uniformity of federal law nationwide. Cf Neuborne, supra note 5, at 778-80 (conflating
reverse-Erie and adoption-of-state-law analyses).
81 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740 (applying the law of the state where the
collateral was located).
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federal court may alter or ignore part or all of the relevant state law in
2
the particular case at bar.
B.

Law Applicable in State Court

Determining the applicable law in state court involves the reverseErie doctrine. Here, unlike in the Erie setting, the relevant federal law
will always be pre-existing, whether of constitutional, congressional, or
judicial origin. 83 This fact means the Supremacy Clause is always in
play. 84 The reverse-Erie question thus becomes whether existing fed-

eral law should displace state law in state court under the Supremacy
Clause. A role for preemption is obvious, but there is a role for judicial choice of law too.
The reverse-Erie question is a relatively simple one if the Constitution or Congress (or its authorized administrative delegate) actually
chose to displace state law in state court. If the lawmaker expressly or
impliedly made federal law applicable in state court, that choice to
preempt is binding on the state courts under the Supremacy Clause,
provided that any such choice was valid under the rest of the
Constitution.8 5

However, in the absence of such a constitutional or congressional
directive, and in the absence of binding precedent, the state courts
and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court must decide whether the existing federal law applies in state court.8 6 The courts do so by employing not only implied-preemption analysis but also a federally
mandated judicial choice-of-law methodology similar to the Erie methodology. Just as the Erie methodology itself is specialized federal common law, the reverse-Erie judicial choice-of-law methodology is a
federal-common-law creation of the U.S. Supreme Court that the state
courts must follow.
If those reverse-Erie methodologies yield a choice in favor of federal law, that choice is binding on the state courts under the
Supremacy Clause. Thus, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co.,817 an interstate water case decided in an opinion by Justice
Brandeis on the same day as his Erie opinion, held that substantive
82 See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1946) (reading a federal tolling notion into a state statute of limitations for a particular federal action on a
federally created claim).
83
84
85
86
87

See infra text accompanying notes 139-46
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
See Bellia, supra note 5, at 840-45.
304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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federal common law, which would govern in the federal courts, 88 also
binds the state courts. But if those methodologies yield a choice in
favor of state law, the state is left free to create and apply it. Thus,
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,8 9 on review of the Oregon Supreme Court, held that state law solely governed the disputed ownership of lands along a navigable river inside
the state, after the lands had become riverbed because of avulsive
changes in the river's course. 0
By such means a great amount of federal law-be it constitutional, statutory, or common law-flows down to apply in state courts.
A lot of it arrives via the preemption doctrine, but some of it undeniably results from judicial choice of federal law for state courts.
1.

Constitutional Limits on This Choice of Law

There exist constitutional limits on the powers of Congress and
the Supreme Court to choose the applicable law for application in
state court. The limits on imposing federal law on the state courts are
quite significant, albeit in practice rather vague. Most prominently,
the federal government cannot extend beyond the relevant boundaries demarcating the matters constitutionally reserved to the states. 9 1
Despite their significance, these constitutional limits are like
those controlling the Erie scheme, and so do not warrant renewed discussion. It suffices here to observe anew that the Federal Constitution
itself made some binding choices of law for state courts. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a nice
92
example.
2.

Legislative Limits on This Choice of Law

Analogously to Erie,Congress can expressly or impliedly make the
choice between state and federal law for application in state court, but
of course only within constitutional limits. A valid congressional
choice will bind the state courts. That is, if Congress chooses the applicable law, the only vertical choice-of-law question remaining for the
courts is whether that choice was constitutionally valid, because the
Constitution imposes the only bourds on the congressional power.9"
88
89
90
91

Id. at 110; see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
429 U.S. 363 (1977).
Id. at 381.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.

92

Id. amend. XIV.

93 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1208-09 (2006);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984).

NOTREu

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:1

of law lies the doctrine of
At the heart of congressional choice
areas, such as patents,
express preemption. For example, in some
specify substantive laws that
Congress can decide to regulate and then
94 Or Congress can
will apply in federal and state courts henceforth.
for state courts' handling of certain
provide procedural regulations
95
the more illuminating choice-oftypes of federal-law cases. Indeed,
the disputed issue moves from the
law problems in state courts arise as
Substantive preemption is
purely substantive to the more procedural.
context, while displacement of
particularistic to some specific legal
and hence revealing, just as
state procedural law is more generalizable
the more instructive in the Erie
the more procedural questions are
context.
the courts are deciding
In all such cases of express preemption,
"meant" to displace state law.
only whether the federal statute was
task. But Congress's purSometimes that decision is a straightforward
from discerning implications
pose can be elusive. As the courts move
more self-consciously decidtoward making inferences and otherwise
own, the courts tend to make
ing the extent of federal law on their
and terminology and to inless use of implied-preemption doctrine
approach analogous to Erie's judivoke more obviously a choice-of-law
.96
cial choice-of-law doctrine
Choice of Law
3. Judicial Methodology for This
use some technique for
Analogously to Erie, the courts must
law for application in state court,
choosing between state and federal
statutes, and binding prewhenever-under the Constitution, federal
as in Erie, the judicial choice-ofcedent-they may go either way. Also
line between state and federal
law cases best explicate the dividing
study. Finally, as that study will
law, and so deserve the most careful
more to the Erie line of cases
show, this judicial methodology relates
law.
than to traditional preemption case
94

ofJurisdictionBetween
See Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation

State and Federal

REV. 633, 657-64 (1971).
Courts in Patent Litigation,46 WAsH. L.
of state
authority to legislate on the operation

95 As to the limit on congressional
(arguing that ConBellia, supra note 16, at 950-51
courts in state-law cases, compare
law cases"), with
"state
enforcing
for
procedures"
gress cannot regulate "state court
a federal tolling
456, 461-63 (2003) (upholding
finks v. Richland County, 538 U.S.
Power and State
also AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., Congressional
statute for state-law claims). See
concongressional
to
focus
(2006) (extending the
CourtJurisdiction,94 GEo. L.J. 949
cases).
trol of state jurisdiction in state-law
198-200.
at
7,
note
supra
96 See Davis,
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a.

Choice-of-Law Role for Courts, As Mandated by U.S.
Supreme Court

Of course, reverse-Erie predates the Erie case, 9 7 just as the Erie
problem itself predates Erie, both problems being as old as federalism
itself. But sophisticated refinement of reverse-Eie methodology had
to await the modern developments on the Erie front. Since Erie's decision, the leading reverse-Erie cases on judicial choice of law have been
Brown,9 8 Dice,9 9 Felder,100 and Johnson' 0 1-respectively, two early and
two recent cases; two Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases
and two § 1983 civil rights cases; two sounding in judicial choice of law
and two sounding in preemption; but all involving whether federal
procedural law binds the state courts.
In Brown, the plaintiff brought an FELA case in a Georgia state
court, alleging that he had suffered injury while working when he
stepped on a large clinker lying in the railroad yards, but he failed to
allege the clinker's circumstances in a way to constitute the railroad's
negligence and to exclude alternative causes. 10 2 The railroad demurred. Contrary to federal practice, a Georgia rule construed allegations most strongly against the pleader and so resulted in dismissal of
the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.10 3 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the Georgia pleading rule had to bow to the
more lenient federal practice:
Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws ....
Should this Court fail to protect federally created rights
from dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements for me97 See, e.g., Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (rejecting a
state pleading rule that deemed a federal official to have waived a federal venue defense in a state personal-injury case, and observing: "Whatever springes the State may
set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion
of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the
name of local practice."); S. Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632, 639-41 (1916) (forcing
federal common law on a state court as to the obligation of carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act); Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 510-13 (1915) (forcing
federal common law on a state court as to the burden of persuasion under the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Bellia, supra note 5, at 898 n.334.
98 Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
99 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
100 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
101 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
102 Brown, 338 U.S. at 295.
103

Id.
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in adjudication of federally
ticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity
10 4
achieved.
be
created rights could not
FELA action in an Ohio state
In Dice, the plaintiff brought an
included a release of all claims that
court. 1 05 The railroad's defenses
10 6 The plaintiff contended that the purwas signed by the plaintiff.
had relied on the defendant's deported release was void because he
document was merely a receipt for
liberately false statement that the
10 7 The Ohio Supreme Court, reversing the intermediate
back wages.
court's entry of judgment for the
appellate court, sustained the trial
holding (1) that Ohio, not
defendant notwithstanding the verdict,
the release, and under that Ohio
federal, law governed the validity of
a man of ordinary intelligence
law the release bound the plaintiff,
false statement had inwho could read, even though a deliberately
controlling Ohio law, all issues
duced him to sign, and (2) that under
release were properly decided by
as to fraud in the execution of this 10 8
The U.S. Supreme Court rethe judge rather than by the jury.
federal common law conversed, holding that the more protective the "factual" issues as to
and that
trolled the validity of the release
jury: "It follows that the right to
the
by
fraud had to be determined
of the rights accorded by the Act
trial by jury is too substantial a part
for
mere 'local rule of procedure'
to permit it to be classified as a
10 9
here used."'
denial in the manner that Ohio has
Felder brought a federal civil
Bobby
In Felder, an arrestee named
court against Milwaukee and certain
10 Alrights action in a Wisconsin state
motivated police brutality.
of its police officers, alleging racially
4
Franksupra note 5, at 407 & n.1 3. Justice
104 Id. at 298-99 (Black, J.); see Hill,
procethat
in terms of the Erie analogy, feeling
furter's dissent spoke more explicitly
301
at
U.S.
338
Brown,
state law. See
law
dure should be left to nondiscriminatory
federal
and
state
between
that the line
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing
reverse
in
way in which we have applied them
should be drawn "in precisely the same
whether the Federal courts respected
problem
Brown
situations-when confronted with the

Erie" and that
rights, as required by the rule in
the substance of State-created kind
this Court dealt in"
which
with
that
as
problem
of
"presents essentially the same

& Ware99 (1945), Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
337 U.S.
Corp.,
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
house Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and

541, 555 (1949)).
R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
105 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown
106 Id. at 360.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 361.
disBrown, 338 U.S. at 296). Justice Frankfurter's dis109 Id. at 363 (Black, J.) (citing
J.,
Erie analogy. See id. at 367-68 (Frankfurter,
sent again spoke in terms of the
at nondiscriminatory procedure).
senting) (drawing the line again
135 (1988).
110 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
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three-year statute of limthough the plaintiff had satisfied Wisconsin's
actions, the officers moved to
itations for general personal-injury
statwith Wisconsin's notice-of-claim
dismiss for failure to comply
in
brought
be
before any suit may
ute. 1I That statute provides that,
addimust
or its officer, the plaintiff
state court against a municipality
of
to the defendant within 120 days
tionally give notice of the claim
rethen has 120 days to act on the
the injury; that the municipality
six
within
suit
must bring the
quested relief; and that the plaintiff
1 2
defendants'
The
disallowance.'
months after notice of the claim's
113 The U.S. Supreme
in state court.
motion ultimately succeeded
Court reversed:
at issue here conflicts both in its
Because the notice-of-claim statute
objectives of § 1983, and bepurpose and effects with the remedial
will frequently and predictcause its enforcement in such actions
§ 1983 litigation based solely on
ably produce different outcomes in
or federal court, we conclude
whether the claim is asserted in state
the § 1983 action is brought
that the state law is pre-empted when
in a state court.
constitutionally obligated to apply
...Just as federal courts are
the Supremacy Clause imposes
state law to state claims, . . . so too
"to proceed in such manner
on state courts a constitutional duty
under controlling federal
parties
of the
that all the substantial11rights
4
law [are] protected."
moved toward preemption,
Thus, although the Court's terminology
to resemble Eri's progeny.
its actual analysis came more overtly
Fankell brought a federal
In Johnson, a worker named Kristine
court, alleging that she 5had been
11
civil rights action in an Idaho state
The dejob without due process.
fired from her state government
of
ground
the
moved for dismissal on
fendant officials unsuccessfully
state
The
to appeal immediately.
qualified immunity, and then tried
even
appeal under its finality rule,
11 6
supreme court dismissed the
appeal.
allowed an interlocutory
have
would
law
though federal
111 Id. at 136.
1987)).
§ 3.80(l)(a)-(b) (1983 & Supp.
112 Id. at 136-37 (citing Wis. STAT. 8 9
113 Id. at 137.
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
114 Jd. at 138, 151 (Brennan, J.) (quoting
64, 78-79
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
U.S. 239, 245 (1942), and citing
of the
tone
"reverse-Erie"
expressly attacked the
(1938)). Justice O'Connor's dissent
J.,
(O'Connor,
161
at
Id.
of federalism."
majority as "a sort of upside-down theory
dissenting).
520 U.S. 911, 913 (1997).
115 Johnson v. Fankell,
4
116 Id. at 913-1 .
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. 11 7 After noting "our normal presumption against pre-emption,"' 8 it sequentially found (1) that the
"dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regarding the administration of the state courts,"' 19 (2) that the federal interests at stake lay in the procedural appealability doctrine rather than
in the substantive qualified-immunity doctrine, 20 and (3) that application of the state rule was not "outcome-determinative" in the Felder
sense.12 It then balanced the state's "countervailing considerations"
regarding "the operation of its courts" against the relatively weak federal interests, at least as the Court viewed them. 122 Thus, the Court
put a limit on federal intrusion into state court procedure.
What other quasi-procedural realms has the Supreme Court
treated? The influence of the four leading cases has spread beyond
their facts, to realms near and far. For example, federal law might
apply in state courts on matters such as burden of proof, joinder, and
venue.' 23 Federal attorney's fee law applies in state court on some
federal claims, 2 4 just as state attorney's fee law would normally apply
in federal court on state claims.1 25 Similarly, the federal law of res
1 26
judicata governs the effects of a federal judgment in a state court,
117 Id. at 913 (Stevens, J., for unanimous Court). This case involved a defendant
asserting a federal immunity, rather than a plaintiff asserting a federal right, but the
analysis did not and should not turn on that point. See PETER W. LOW & JOHlN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 64-65 (5th
ed. 2004). But see LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 519-20 (3d
ed. 2004).
118 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 919-20.
121 Id. at 920.
122 Id. at 922.
123 See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 736-37, 767 n.173; see also Paul J. Katz, Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, FederalStanding Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie
Analysis, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1316-17 (2005) (discussing how standing requirements of state courts can affect federal procedural rules in different ways). Relatedly,
federal jurisdictional law might conceivably apply in state courts under the reverseErie doctrine. See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The FederalInterest in PersonalJurisdiction, 56 FoRDHtAm L. Ruv. 1, 49-51 (1987). But cf. Am. Dredging Co. v.
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 (1994) (applying state forum non conveniens law).
124 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (applying federal attorney's fee
law in a state court action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
125 See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRiG-T, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511, at 365 n.93 (2d ed. 1996).
126 See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion,54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 316
n.100 (1993) ("In essence, federal common law endows federal judgments with the
same obligatory effects as the full faith and credit statute provides for state judgments .... "). This result follows from the strong federal interests in defining the
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and, conversely, state res judicata law would normally govern the ef1 27
fects of a state judgment in a federal court.

The best illustrations of the reach of the Supreme Court's reverse-Erie cases come from jury practice. The uncontroversial background is that state jury practice is widely similar to the federal, but it
need not be; very importantly, the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated or implicit in Fourteenth Amendment due process, hence
does not apply to the states, and so does not constrain state civil trials;
and for state-law claims, the states in fact have generally not followed
the Supreme Court's modern expansion of the jury right t2 8 Yet, federal jury practice may apply in state courts under the reverse-Erie doctrine. 129 In the converse situation, state jury practice normally does
scope of federal judgments, in adapting that resjudicata law to the federal procedural
system, and in developing a uniform federal law of res judicata and a simple retroverse approach to judgments in a federal system. However, when the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction in the first court was diversity, the Supreme Court has
pronounced that this federal law will adopt the first court's local state law of res judicata as the federal common law, except when that state law is incompatible with federal interests. In Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497
(2001), the Court reviewed the respect a Maryland state court owed to a statute-oflimitations dismissal by a California federal court in a removed diversity case and held:
In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity....
...This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in
the State in which the federal diversity court sits....
This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.
Id. at 508-09. Given the particular federal interests at play here, a better approach
for diversity judgments might be to invert the Court's presumption, so as normally to
apply a uniform federal res judicata law and only sometimes to adopt the state res
judicata law, when state substantive policies spike high, such as for nonmutual collateral estoppel. See Patrick Woolley, The Sources of FederalPreclusionLaw After Semtek, 72
U. CIN. L. REv. 527, 594-98 (2003).
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). However, sometimes federal law has a role. Besides existing exceptions to § 1738, the state resjudicata law itself is not free of federal
command, Most importantly, due process requires that the state not preclude on the
basis of a judgment if the proceedings did not afford a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. That is, the state must have a basically fair resjudicata law, which will apply in
that state's own courts as well as in federal court to specify the effects of that state's
judgments. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-83 (1982).
128 See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR
A BAsic COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 133-34, 1414 (8th ed. 2003).
129 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1980) (holding that, in
state court FELA cases, federal law governs jury instruction); Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding that, in state court FELA cases,
federal law governs jury right). The Supreme Court has followed Norfolk, looking to
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130 And so some
Erie doctrine.
not apply in federal courts under the Erie begins to emerge.- 3 1
and
dissimilarity between reverse-Erie
by State Courts
b. Choice-of-Law Role for Courts, As Applied
the U.S. Supreme Court
State courts provide cases similar to
produce most of the reversecases. 132 State courts could potentially
not terrifically illuminating, beErie law.1 33 Yet these state cases are

thereby
instructions in a reverse-Erie case and
federal law on measure-of-damages jury
present-valuea
have
could
action
FELA
court
deciding that the defendant in a state
409, 412
Louis Sw. Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S.
St.
See
instruction.
of-future-losses
Monessen
also
see
and reversing per curiam);
(1985) (summarily granting certiorari
(1988) (holding that, in such a case, present339-42
330,
U.S.
486
Sw. Ry. v. Morgan,
the
But the Supreme Court years ago allowed
value calculation is the jury's task).
St.
&
rule in an FELA case. Minneapolis
state court to apply its own nonunanimity
supra
Neuborne,
generally
218-19 (1916). See
Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,
apply state or federal jury rules).
courts
when
(discussing
note 5, at 772-74
Elec.
221 (1963); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
130 See Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S.
U.S.
518
Inc.,
v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). But cf Gasperini
new
a
granting
on
decision
to a district court's
415, 426-31 (1996) (applying state law
trial).
169-72 (explaining dissimilarity).
131 See infra text accompanying notes
770-75.
at
5,
132 See Neuborne, supra note
federal
in state court could arise in a lower
133 The question of what law applies
in the
court,
federal
the
when
implicitly arises
court. For example, that question
issue, considers the outcome-determinative
course of deciding an Erie choice-of-law
apply in state court. But the fact is that
would
law
factor and hence must resolve what
in that setting on the subtleties of reverse-Erie.
no federal court has waxed informative
the federal court, having decided that
The question arises more explicitly when
and
under Erie, considers the state law's content
state law applies in the federal court
Allaw.
state
law has preempted or displaced
hence the extent to which federal
discussion
enlightening
and
generate frequent
though this setting could conceivably
of federal cases that get into explicit discusmajority
overwhelming
the
of reverse-Erie,
the issue
because the Supreme Court so framed
sions are admiralty cases, apparently
(1986)
223
207,
U.S.
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477
in one such case. See Offshore Logistics,
is coninjuries
maritime
remedy
be used to
("[Tlhe extent to which state law may
remesubstantive
the
that
requires
which
strained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine
Most
to governing federal maritime standards.").
dies afforded by the States conform
and
state
in
applies
law
the same substantive
of these admiralty cases just observe that
treatsame
the
receive
should
admiralty claims
federal courts, so that diversity and
162
Abandoned Vessel, Known as "New York,"
&
Floating
v.
Dluhos
e.g.,
ment. See,
deterof
course
some admiralty cases, in the
F.3d 63, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1998). However,
court, get into more interesting discussions
federal
in
mining the law for application
32 F.3d
Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish,
of preemption of state law. See, e.g.,
recovfor
application of a Rhode Island statute
623, 626-31 (1st Cir. 1994) (allowing
natural resources).
ery of economic loss from damage to
courts, in other than these quintessentially
federal
lower
do
Only occasionally
For
state court itself would apply federal law.
Erie settings, decide directly whether the
claim
state-law
to decide if preemption makes a
example, a federal court might have
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yond suggesting that state courts are dutiful in trying to follow the
4
U.S. Supreme Court's lead, at least when they see the issue.11
Thus, in adjudicating federal-law claims, state courts apply federal
law on clearly substantive questions, 13 5 and generally state courts appleaded in state court nevertheless removable. See, e.g., Watson v. Symons Corp., 121
F.R.D. 351, 355 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (saying that preemption of the field of labormanagement relations made case removable); cf Daniel Jordan Simon, Comment,
Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts Have Opened the Door to the Eradication of
"Our Federalism," 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355, 1380-84 (2005) (discussing an analogous
setting). Or a federal court, in deciding whether to issue an antisuit injunction, might
have to perform a reverse-Erie analysis to determine what law the state court would
apply. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 319-25 (5th Cir. 1987)
(examining whether federal maritime law displaces state law), rev'd on other grounds,
486 U.S. 140 (1988); Villar v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1467, 1485-86 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (same), affd, 990 F.2d 1489 (5th Cir. 1993); cf Diesel "Repower," Inc. v.
Islander Invs. Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (involving a similar setting).
134 See, e.g., Bowman v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 142 N.E.2d 104, 114 (Ill. 1957) (ruling that
in state court FELA cases, federal law governs new-trial availability and standard,
under Dice); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 21-28 (Wash. 1993) (ruling that in state court admiralty cases, federal law precludes application of state-law
remedy for economic loss of yachts, under reverse-Erie doctrine). CompareAxess Int'l
Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 1, 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that in state
court admiralty cases, state law normally governs the right to attorney's fees, with the
court saying that this result "depends on a balancing of the federal and state interests
involved"), with Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1995)
(ruling that in federal court admiralty cases, federal law normally governs the right to
attorney's fees).
There are literally millions of state cases applying reverse-Erie, because the
choice-of-law issue is ubiquitous. SeeJAMEs E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES or FEDERALJuRISDICTION § 6.5, at 138 (2006) (noting that the "problem arises with monotonous regularity"). But most such applications are intuitive. Few cases shed light on the
appropriate methodology. A search for all state cases in Westlaw that were aware
enough to refer to reverse-Erie by name yields only forty-seven cases through 2005.
Again, most of these cases, thirty-seven of them in fact, were admiralty cases, which
carefully followed the complicated relationship there between federal and state law.
See, e.g., Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1990) ("As the author of the
only treatise on the relationship between state law and federal maritime law has explained the process, courts balance the 'federal interest against the countervailing
state interests in regulating local activity and in providing relief to its citizens from

personal injury impairment."' (quoting

DAVID

W. ROBERTSON, AbMIRALTY

AND FEDER-

195 (1970))). The ten nonadmiralty cases are cited and discussed infra notes
135-37 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the only U.S. Supreme Court
review given to any of these forty-seven cases affirmed the highest state court's application of the state law of forum non conveniens, after that state court had reversed the
lower courts' application of federal law. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
447 (1994).
135 See, e.g., Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2003) (ruling
that federal law governs successor-employer liability under Title VII); Mfrs. Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. App. 2004) (ruling that
ALISM
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136 On the classic
questions.
ply state law on clearly procedural
of limitations, the state courts
problems in between, such as statutes 37
that federal courts do in the
come out the same way on reverse-Erie1
38 with each deferring to the other sovereign.
Erie setting,
law governs, then the
If the state court determines that federal
might be constitutional, statustate court applies it. The federal law
purely federal, or it might involve
tory, or common law; it might be
law; it might be fully formulated
state law adopted as federal common
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than by undertaking to formucourts would decide is the law, rather
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late federal law either in pursuit
prinin accordance with nonpositivist
that might guide a legislature or
1 39 That is, the state
court.
ciples that might guide a freely law-creating applying state law under
when
do
court should act as federal courts

Telephone
enhanced damages under the Federal
federal law governs the standard for
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)).
799 N.Y.S.2d
Cape Canaveral Tour & Travel, Inc.,
136 See, e.g, Rudgayzer & Gratt v.
TCPA);
under
joinder
governs
law
that state
Term
795, 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (ruling
App.
(N.Y.
Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603
Rudgayzer & Gratt v. LRS Commc'ns,
CanavCape
v.
Ganci
joinder by terms of TCPA);
2004) (ruling that state law governs
Ct. Apr.
2004 WL 1469372, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
18462/03,
No.
eral Tour & Travel, Inc.,
Cent. Gulf
Ill.
cf
But
TCPA).
under
joinder
CIV.
15, 2004) (ruling that state law governs
(ruling that the content of FED. R.
1988)
(Ala.
206
202,
2d
So.
539
R.R. v. Price,
civility
of
concepts
"the
by
the court observing that
P. 25(a) governs under FELA, with
law that
we reach the concept that an Alabama
before
reach
and courtesy (which we
it be subwhether
law,
federal
to
defer
yield), we
interferes with a federal law must
federal courts
a federal cause of action, just as the
enforcing
in
procedural,
or
stantive
infra
explained
it be substantive or procedural"),
have deferred to State law, whether
text accompanying notes 169-72.
Dist. Ct. App.
v. Lind, 753 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla.
137 See, e.g., Corp. Sec. Group
the Federal
under
who decides arbitrability
2000) (ruling that federal law governs
Inc., 169
Team,
Placement
& Assocs. v. Advanced
Arbitration Act); David L. Smith
limitaof
statute
governs
law
(ruling that federal
Inc. v.
S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App. 2005)
King,
Chair
it adopts state law as federal law);
v.
tions under TCPA, although here
Mohamed
(same);
389-92 (Tex. App. 2004)
GTE Mobitnet, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365,
governs
law
federal
that
(Tex. App. 1990) (ruling
Exxon Corp., 796 S.W.2d 751, 755
a civil rights action).
in
judgment
the effect of a federal
resolutions of
note 125, § 4511 (summarizing Erie
138 See 19 WIG1HT ET AL., supra
the classic problems).
139 See Bellia, supra note 5, at 889.
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Erie. 4 0 In both the Erie setting and the reverse-Erie setting, the court's
job is to apply the other sovereign's law, not to create law for it.
If the content of the governing federal law is really unclear, how
should the state court determine that content? No undisputed answer
exists to this pervasive question,' 4 1 which is obviously fundamental
enough to occur regularly to my first-year students and which is thus
illustrative of how unexplored all reverse-Erie matters remain. Specifically, the question of whether state courts are bound by lower federal
courts on the federal law's content remains open. 142 The better
view-mainly trying to effectuate the constitutional status of state
courts, while accepting some local disuniformity in the short term-is
that the state court should try to determine what the U.S. Supreme
Court would rule.1 43 On the one hand, the state court should not
consider itself actually bound, rather than merely informed, by the
local federal courts' rulings. On the other hand, the state court would
naturally be bound under stare decisis by decisions within the state's
hierarchy of courts as to the federal law's content.
This closer consideration suggests that Erie and reverse-Erie do
not impose strictly the same task on the courts: Erie is telling the federal court when to apply and if necessary create federal law, while re140 See id. at 908 n.369. But cf Robert A. Schapiro, InterurisdictionalEnforcement of
Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1425-29 (2005) (arguing for
the legitimacy of a more active role for federal courts in interpreting state law).
141 No federal statute authorizes certification of unsettled questions from state
courts to a federal court. Indeed, certification to a lower federal court, rather than to
the U.S. Supreme Court, would denigrate the state courts' status as equally competent
enunciators of what the Supreme Court would say as to federal law. Cf FIELD ET AL.,
supra note 128, at 346-47 (criticizing certification by federal courts to a state court on
additional grounds).
142 Comparatively thorough treatment appears in WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6,
§ 45, at 294 n.25 (noting "interesting question" in footnote).
143 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir.
1970); Corp. Sec. Group v. Lind, 753 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("Thus
it is clear that we did not simply decide to follow the holding of the local federal
appellate court on this issue. Instead we applied a 'reverse-Erie' method in which we
felt obligated to decide the issue as we believed the United States Supreme Court
would do so if it were instead considering the matter." (footnote omitted)); Hall v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859 (Pa. 2004); Bellia, supra note 5, at 839 n.64; cf
Charles L. Black, Jr., Is the State of Georgia in the Fifth Circuit?, 81 YALE L.J. 30, 31 (1971)
("[T]he political structure known as 'The State of Georgia' is in no sense and in no
way encompassed 'within' the appellate power of the [then] Fifth Circuit."). But see
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally Donald H. Zeigler,
Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain
Federal Law, 40 Wm. & MAv L. REv. 1143 (1999) (describing the division in case law,
but concluding, as do other scholars cited therein, in favor of the view expressed in
the text above).
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to apply existing federal law so
verse-Erie is telling the state court when
command of the Supremacy
as to displace state law under the
envisage a federal court's Erie
Clause. 14 4 The state court may have to
law, and may have to enunanalysis to determine the reach of federal
a federal-law-applier and will
ciate unclear federal law, but it is merely
true sense. To say it once again,
never act as a federal lawmaker in the
federal law, but never create
it will decide in accordance with existing
not deserve exaggeration. After
federal law. Still, the difference does
too are attempting to discern
all, in theory the lower federal courts
what the Supreme Court would do.
of this view of the state
Finally, do note the profound implication
1
court role

45

hierarchies that
: it makes the state courts into judicial

federal
law, parallel to the lower
46 A state
can independently enunciate federal
Supreme Court review.'
courts and subject only to rare U.S.
system, either the lower federal
is not bound by any coequal court
courts. But a state is not free
courts or, for that matter, another state's
we are talking about a state
just to go its own way, because at bottom
of the Supremacy Clause.
applying federal law under the constraint
bloom. The state courts are
This is no place to let a thousand flowers
Supreme Court has decided or
under a duty to follow what the U.S.
would rule.

ap(showing that the Supremacy Clause
144 See Dinh, supra note 32, at 2088-92
plies only to existing law).
of the
this view complicates any consideration
145 Among practical reverberations,
rartoo
analysis, albeit in a way perhaps
outcome-determinative factor in reverse-Erie
As one court has explained:
efied to be taken into account by courts.
district court must apply the law
federal
a
course,
of
Under the Erie doctrine,
ruling on state law questions. Thus,
of the state in which it sits when
a federal court does not affect what
or
whether a case comes before a state
law will govern its resolution.
however, the reverse of Erie
When the case involves a federal question,
imposes on state courts a constitudoes not apply. "[Tlhe Supremacy Clause
all the substantial rights of the
that
tional duty 'to proceed in such manner
[are] protected."' State courts need
parties under controlling federal law
federal district in which they sit when
not, however, apply the law of the
case
Thus, the law governing a particular
ruling on questions of federal law.
or federal
state
a
in
up
winds
case
the
may differ depending on whether
courts.
omitted)
351, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citations
Watson v. Symons Corp., 121 F.R.D.
133 (1988)).
(quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457,
Future
The
Solimine,
E.
146 See Michael
1473-78 (2005).
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c. Judicial Choice-of-Law Methodology, Fleshed Out
All this reverse-Erie case law has established that state courts must
perform a choice-of-law process mandated by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Admittedly, the cases fail to express a clearly developed
choice-of-law methodology, often not going beyond a wooden reference to preemption here or some vague reference to Erie there. Teasing out a methodology therefore becomes the project.
Reading the evocative state cases-those that raise a quasi-procedural issue in a federal claim when neither express preemption nor
even direct conflict with a federal statute is in play-generates a realization that here any search for preemptive congressional intent is unrealistic and that the courts must on their own face competing state
and federal interests. In other words, the problem has morphed from
classic preemption into a choice of law that requires an Erie-like judicial methodology.
Then, upon closer examination, the courts in many of these reverse-Erie cases do appear to employ a judicial choice-of-law methodology at least similar to the one worked out by the Erie line of cases
down to Gasperini, most often doing so implicitly but sometimes explicitly) 4 7 In my view, the lower courts, just as the Supreme Court did
in Johnson,148 balance the state's interests in having its legal rule applied in state court on this issue in this case against the federal interests in having federal law displace the rule of this particular state,
while trying to avoid differences in outcome.
Just as in the Erie setting, reverse-Erie balancing means no more
than the contextualized exercise of judgment in the face of competing interests.' 49 There are other statements of the choice-of-law standard floating around, such as that federal common law applies in the
state courts when a federal rule of decision is "'necessary to protect

147 See, e.g., Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 676 So. 2d 89, 94 (La. 1996)
(observing in an admiralty case that "the United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the decision whether to apply a state rule must be based upon a balancing of
state and federal interests"); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm'r of Labor &
Indus., 608 P.2d 1047, 1060 (Mont. 1979) ("weighing and balancing state and federal
interests" under NLRA), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Local 1804, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 428 A.2d 1283, 1288 (N.J. 1981) ("balancing" in an ERISA case); Axess Int'l Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 1, 7 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (observing in an admiralty case that the result "depends on a balancing of
the federal and state interests involved").
148 SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918-22 (1997).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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uniquely federal interests,"'" 50 but any such statement seems to represent more a specific application of the balancing test than a com15 1
prehensive formulation.
It is also worth noting, with respect to the amount of federal law
injected into the state courts, that balancing does not dictate either
intrusive or deferential results. The outcome of balancing depends
on the weights given the various recognized interests. Using balancing, one could, for example, still champion outcomes of judicial
choice of law that greatly favor state law, based on the view that (1)
courts should not be active articulators of governmental interests or
(2) our constitutional scheme supports a presumption in favor of state
interests and hence in favor of state law in state courts.1 5 2 Although
my discussion here focuses on methodology, and not necessarily on
outcomes, I would nonetheless argue for carrying over the interests
and their weights as worked out in the Erie setting. First, countering
the argument as to the passive role for courts, reverse-Eie is easier to
justify than Erie itself. Erie sometimes involves the creation of federal
law by the federal courts, but reverse-Erie merely has state courts deciding whether existing federal law displaces state law. Although the
state courts can create state law, they cannot create federal law.1 53
Second, countering the argument as to the weightiness of state interests, there is no reason that state interests in state court should weigh
more heavily than federal interests do in federal court. Any presumption here in favor of state law, like the presumption against preemption, is more a figure of speech than a real rule. 15 4 The very existence
55
of the Supremacy Clause would seem to suggest as much.
150 Bellia, supra note 5, at 834 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); cf id. at 840-45 (discussing methodology more generally).
151
See PETER HlAY & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM 309
& n.417 (1982).
152 See, e.g.,
Clark, supra note 19, at 1413-19; Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The MissingLink, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 88-102 (1988); Young, supra note
14, at 132. But see, e.g., Redish & Sklaver, supra note 5, at 105-08.
153 See supra text accompanying note 144. One cannot, however, turn the argument around to champion more intrusive injection of federal law into the state
courts. After all, state courts could not and would not be more active than the federal
courts in articulating federal interests.
154 See Davis, supranote 7, at 222; Dinh, supranote 32, at 2092-97; Nelson, Preemption, supra note 27, at 290-303; cf.James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 111 (2005)
("The malleability of these language canons, and the uncertain weight and cyclical
fashionability of certain substantive canons, should serve as a warning against unduly
ambitious claims on their behalf.").
155 Here it is possible to turn the argument around to champion more intrusive
federal law in state courts. Any spillover from Supremacy Clause notions (and any
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and does, closely resemble
So, the reverse-Erie balance should,
same.
basic methodologies are the
the Erie balance. In fact, the
differfederal interests, and outcome
Courts balance state interests,
in
differently
little
a
factors plays out
ences. Yet the last of those three
explain
me
and federal court. Let
the different settings of state court
by fleshing out the details of balancing.
effect belongs on
To begin, an Erie-like outcome-determinative
56
Courts
Felderunambiguously ruled.1
the reverse-Eie balance, just as
federal
and
state
in
outcomes
do and should yearn to avoid different
court choice of law requires
state
about
court. But to be more specific
on choice of law in federal court.
another look back to Erie's progeny
could in
of law that might favor federal law)
effect of a federally mandated choice
example,
For
heavily than state interests.

more
theory make federal interests weigh
that,
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498 (1980) (holding
v.
Railway
consider Norfolk & Western
instruction
nontaxability
cautionary
law required
in a state court FELA case, federal
v. Mitchell, 475
Although the state in Klawonn
129.
note
supra
to jury), discussed
nontaxability instruction was
1985), reaffirmed that a cautionary
N.E.2d 857, 861 (Ill.
appellate court
case in state court, the federal
improper in a state-law wrongful-death
(7th Cir.
1199-200
1189,
F.2d
Chicago, Illinois, 701
in In re Air Crash Disaster Near
304, 313-16 (7th Cir.
Disaster Near Chi., Ill., 803 F.2d
1983), followed by In reAir Crash
did not apply
against giving such an instruction
1986), held that the Illinois rule
cautionary
death,
in Illinois federal court for wrongful
under Erie in a diversity action
is more
Norfolk
that
seem
federal law. Thus, it would
instructions being governed by
law
state
applying
in
is
Crash
Air
on state courts than
intrusive in inflicting federal law
in federal courts.
balancing, in
perceive that judicial choice-of-law
However, in practice, I do not
law in state courts,
in greater intrusiveness of federal
contrast to preemption, results
accompanying
text
in federal courts. See supra
as compared to state law applying
opposite of
the
hold
fact
in
above example, most cases
notes 134-38. To pursue the
strengthhave
to
seem
would
law
to apply state
Air Crash, and Gasperini's willingness
(8th Cir. 1990);
1382
1373,
F.2d
892
Corp.,
v. FMC
ened their hand. See, e.g., Gander
Coy v. Simpson
F.2d 271, 276-78 (8th Cir. 1987);
820
Inc.,
Indus.,
Fuqua
v.
Adams
v. Evans, 525 F.
Gerbich
F.2d 19, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1986);
Marine Safety Equip., Inc., 787
are not really
Crash
Air
and
Norfolk
And anyway,
Supp. 817, 819-20 (D. Colo. 1981).
state law required a
of Norfolk would arise when the
converse cases. The converse
in which case the fedfederal practice did not permit,
cautionary instruction that the
Plan, Inc., 876
Health
See Schleier v. Kaiser Found.
eral court would apply state law.
in a diversity
instruction
(applying a state cautionary
F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
case).
But see LINDAJ. SILBER131,138, 141,151-53 (1988).
156 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
MANUAL, CrvIL PROCETEACHER'S
WOLFF,
BARRINGTON
MAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBLAS
doctrine and Erie-the
one key difference between this
DURE 111 (2d ed. 2006) ("Note
the case to federal
equal ability to bring or remove
parties, in most cases, had the
misplaced; if einormally
are
determination'
court. Thus, concerns about 'outcome
in most cases,
procedures, they could have,
ther party wanted access to federal
omitted)).
brought the case there .... (citations
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extended dicta, a refined verThe Court in Hannaformulated, by
test. Under this refinement,
sion of its earlier outcome-determinative
differences in outcome, but only
the courts should look not to mere
Erie
undermine "the twin aims of the
to differences in law that would
inequitable
and avoidance of
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping
1 57 By this phrase, as illuminated in later
administration of the laws."'
to the federal interest in avoidcases, 158 the Court apparently referred
law applied in the federal court and
ing those differences between the
of
would inflict the systemic costs
in the forum state court (1) that
state courts by plaintiff or defenforum-shopping between federal and
(2) that would cause the unfairness
dant or, much more importantly,
differently in a substantial way
of treating similarly situated persons
syspeople have a choice of court
simply because certain classes of
or
between plaintiff and defendant
tems, whether the comparison is
party identical in all but citizenship.
between party and hypothetical
courts should lean toward applying
Under Erie, therefore, the federal
differences that are significant in
state law when necessary to avoid
either of those two ways.
is a federal interest in the uniLikewise under reverse-Eie, there
159 As to forum-shopstate court.
formity of law applied in federal and
to avoid shopping by plaintiffs
ping, there should still be some desire
As to inequitable administraor defendants between the two systems.
of
unfairness in that certain classes
tion of the laws, there is still an
danbigger
the
However, here
people have a choice of court systems.
systems on matters of federal conger is choosing among state court
and federal court systems, because
cern, rather than between state
have equal access to federal court.
usually albeit not always the parties
to interstate shopping,
That is, the emphasis should shift somewhatshopping. Federal rights
intrastate
rather than worrying mainly about
state to state. Any horizontal legal
and duties should not vary from
and inequitable administradifferences will produce forum-shopping
to the vertical dangers feared in
tion in the reverse-Eie setting similar
in avoiding such dangers means
the Erie setting. The constant interest
effect should receive about
that a comparable outcome-determinative
60
the same weight in each setting.'
460, 468 (1965).
157 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-45 (1980).
Steel
Armco
v.
Walker
158 See, e.g.,
(1986).
v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23
159 See Offshore Logistics, Inc.
(holding in a
2005)
(Wis.
706 N.W.2d 299, 310
160 See Shaw v. Leatherberry,
elevated
standard of proof displaces the state's
that
§ 1983 action that the ordinary federal
factors
cases, and observing among other
"althat
standard of proof for police-brutality
and
the federal interest in uniformity"
the
applying state law would "disrupt
where
on
solely
based
for the same action,
lowing different burdens of proof
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Note, finally, that for reverse-Erie the outcome-determinative effect (OD) should add to the other federal interests in having federal
law applied in state court (affirmative countervailing considerations,
or ACC), because applying federal law would avoid outcome-determinative differences among federal and state courts. In other words, the
outcome-determinative effect becomes a reason not to apply state law.
Accordingly, the formulation most analogous to an Erie balance of
[state interests versus (ACC - OD) ] is, for reverse-Erie, the balance of
[state interests versus (ACC + OD)]. 16 1
C.

Interrelatingthe Doctrines

Return the focus to the whole subject of applicable federal and
state law in state court, including both preemption and judicial choice
of law. The foregoing analysis revealed that considerable federal law
flows down to apply in state courts. In areas of strong federal concern,
such as clearly "substantive" areas of great federal interest, federal law
applies in state court, sometimes even by direct constitutional command. As one moves into more "procedural" areas of both federal
and state concern, the hard reverse-Erie cases arise. Finally, as one
moves into clearly "substantive" areas of great state concern, state law
more surely governs, often by constitutional necessity.
action is brought, would be discriminatory against Wisconsin plaintiffs, and would, in
effect, violate the purposes of § 1983"); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1415-20 (2006).
161 In both Erie and reverse- Erie, the formula balances the forum's interests minus
OD versus the other sovereign's interests. The two doctrines are thus symmetrical
theoretically. But the shifting side for OD could conceivably induce a circularity in
application of procedural law, with the federal court applying state law in pursuit of
conformity and the state court ironically applying federal law on the same issue in the
same pursuit of conformity. Cf Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 4, at 987 n.155 ("In a
manner quite parallel to the operation of renvoi in choice of law practice, a federal
court asserting diversity jurisdiction over a case raising federal questions (by way of
defense) should apply state law (Erie, including a fair amount of state procedure), but
the state courts must apply federal law (Dice, including a fair amount of federal procedure), so the federal court imitates the state court which is imitating the federal
courts, and thereby ends up following federal law in diversity. It may be helpful to
think of this in terms of a dog chasing its own tail.").
Reassuringly, this highly unrealistic result could never occur in actuality, because
the Erie balance always must precede the reverse-Erie balance and so the state court
will know if the federal court would apply state law. That is, even in state court, the
first question is what law the federal court would apply; and if the answer is state law,
then under reverse-Erie the state court will likewise apply state law, because only state
interests persist. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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Viewed broadly in this way, the reverse-Eriesubject makes sense,
and it also appears quite similar to Erie. Judge Henry Friendly, seeing
a harmonious unity, nicely expressed the symmetry:
The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow
state decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas state courts must follow federal decisions
on subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so
directed or the basic scheme of the Constitution demands-seem so
beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder
why a century and a half were needed to discover them, and must
wonder even more why anyone should want to shy away once the
discovery was made. We may not yet have achieved the best of all
possible worlds with respect to the relationship between state and
federal law. But the combination of Erie [with reverse-Erie] has
brought us to a far, far better one than we have ever known
162

before.

1.

Troubling Asymmetry Between Erie and Reverse-Erie

Unfortunately, the Friendly quotation misleads somewhat. The
actually prevailing scheme does not render reverse-Erie simply the mir16 3
ror image of Erie.
a.

Intrusiveness of Reverse-Erie

The major difference is that reverse-Erie is a more intrusive doctrine in terms of results realized in the real world: in that middle area
between state and federal substantive law, state courts must apply federal procedural law to federally created claims more extensively than
federal courts must apply state procedural law to state-created claims.
For example, according to Brown, in the state court the Georgia pleading rule had to bow to the more lenient federal practice.1 64 In the
162

J. FRIENDLY, In Praise of Erie -and of the New Federal Common Law, in
155, 195 (1967).
163 See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 319 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Therefore, if the 'reverse-Erie' doctrine is perfectly symmetrical, it follows that state
courts are not obligated to apply federal forum non conveniens analysis in maritime
cases. We reject this facile syllogism; drawing conclusions from metaphors is dangerous.... Because the Erie diversity doctrine and the 'reverse-Erie' maritime doctrine
spring from distinct principles and policies, there is no reason to expect a perfect
symmetry between them."), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
164 Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (holding that, in a state court
FELA case, federal law trumps the more demanding state pleading practice); see also
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding that, in
a state court FELA case, jury trial was a basic part of the federal rights).
HENRY
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case, a federal court would never
analogous Erie setting of a diversity
65
practice . 1 There can be no doubt,
bow to a contrary state pleading
proper comparison-say, compardespite the debate, that upon the
in
law for federal causes of action
ing the whole range of applicable
of action in federal court-reversestate court to that for state causes66
than Erie."
Erie is more intrusive
any excessive zeal for federal law
Perhaps one might try to ascribe
reverse-Erie cases of Brown and Dice
to the fact that initially the key
that they were decided in the heyinvolved the pro-plaintiff FELA or
test. However, recent cases
day of the Court's outcome-determinative
law other than in favor of FELA
such as Felder, which apply federal
1 67 Brown and Dice today
attempts.
6
plaintiffs, rebut such explanatory
intrusive principle.1 1 All such
deeply,
not
if
even
broadly,
a
for
stand
instead accept the generalized
restricted explanations fail. One must
puissant than state law and hence
explanation: federal law is more
more intrusive.
interferes with federal interests
Nevertheless, much state law that
must confront the major
still applies in state court. One therefore
federal interests not so potent as
puzzlement of reverse-Erie why are
in their way in state court? That is,
to push aside all state law that gets
play, how can the dam hold
once federal supremacy comes into
The elusive explanation is that the
against the flood of federal law?
58; Cohen v.
460 (1965), discussed supra note
165 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
grounds, 204
other
on
part
in
(l1th Cir. 1999), vacated
Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292
F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
that the role for
note 6, § 45, at 293 (concluding
166 See WmcGT & KANr, supra
cf. Redish &
procedure's role is "de minimis");
federal law is so extensive that state
doctrine).
reverse-Erie
(arguing for a very intrusive
Sklaver, supra note 5, at 105-08
that the
surprising
not
thus
156, at 111 ("It is
But see SILBERMAN ET AL, supra note
than
courts
state
in
procedures
of federal
Supreme Court has been far less protective
117,
court."); cf Low &JEFFRIES, supra note
it has been of state procedures in federal
on
"Notes
as
coverage
and so entitling its
at 57 (conveying only a part of reverse-Erie
Procedures").
to Apply Federal
the Occasional Duty of State Courts
Offshore
138, 151 (1988); see also, e.g., Gulf
131,
U.S.
487
167 See Felder v. Casey,
in a state
reverse-Erie
(applying
(1981)
473, 484-88
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
171, 174 (Tex.
Act case), remanded to 628 S.W.2d
Lands
Shelf
Continental
court Outer
Norfolk
question);
had settled the choice-of-law
App. 1982) (deciding that Congress
a state
in
rule
pro-defendant
498 (1980) (applying
& W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,
court FELA case).
applies across
however, that Dicdsjury holding
168 This principle does not mean,
setsubstantive
would take into account the federal
bethe board, because choice of law
board,
the
across
pleading holding applies
It
ting. Nor does it mean that Brown's
question.
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intrusiveness of federal law comes through a sluice gate, located at the
preemption side of reverse-Erie rather than on its judicial balancing
side.
b.

Preemption

The explanation for the discrepancy between the reaches of federal and state laws under reverse-Erie and Erie is that the Supremacy
Clause plays a nonobvious role through the preemption doctrine.
Conflict preemption works in favor of federal law by rejecting not only
any state law that openly discriminates against or contradicts federal
law but also any state law that otherwise imposes unnecessary burdens
upon federal rights, as in the two examples of Brown and Dice, which
lie just within the outer boundary of conflict preemption.16 9 Preemption so acts regardless of the outcome of any balancing methodology.
Accordingly, federal law spills down into state court much more than
state law applies in federal court, but only where conflict preemption
reigns.
The preemptive federal law might be constitutional, statutory, or
common law. For one example, federal defenses to state-law claims,
like qualified immunity, should apply much more commonly in state
70
court than do state defenses to federal-law claims in federal court.'
So too should federal procedural law spill down more easily than state
procedural law flows up. 7 1 Or, to return to that Brown example and
at last explain it, the state's anti-plaintiff pleading rule fell because the
Court saw it as directly colliding in that case with the pro-plaintiff
FELA. 172 The result was a preemption that rejected any state interests.
In the converse-Brown setting, when the question would be whether a
state's pro-plaintiff pleading rule applies in a diversity case, the Erie
balance manages to tilt in favor of the federal pleading law. That is,
federal procedural interests overcome the interests in favor of applying state law, even to the extent of establishing Hanna's blanket approach for the Federal Rules. 173 In Brown the Supremacy Clause
169 See DRAiHozAL, supra note 15, at 84-86, 102-05, 112; Hill, supra note 5, at 387,
390, 405, 414-15.
170 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
171 See DRAiqozAL, supra note 15, at 84-86.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 and notes 164-68 and accompanying text; see also 111. Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Price, 539 So. 2d 202, 205-06 (Ala. 1988) (ruling that the content of FED. R. Cfv. P. 25(a) governs under FELA). This holding is
supported by the fact that there is no equivalent of Hanna for blanket protection of

state procedural rules from preemption.
173

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
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causes federal procedure to preempt state procedure,174 but in converse-Brown the Supremacy Clause obviously plays no comparable role
to cause the state sovereign's law to trump any conflicting rules of the
home court.
c. Judicial Choice of Law
Now consider reverse-Erie as the situation moves from direct collisions between state and federal laws, to obstacle preemption and
other situations where it really is the court determining the extent of
the federal law. Then, although preemption terminology might remain in play, reverse-Erie's balancing methodology is phasing in and
taking over in reality. In this zone, where one encounters cases like
Felder and Johnson just inside the border of judicial choice of law, 175
the court performs a more truly independent role through balancing.
Because of the similarity of their balancing methodologies, reverse-Erie and Erie look much more alike here. Indeed, as developed
in a previous section, neither theory nor practice suggests that much
of a discrepancy in results exists.1 7 There is no need, just in order to
explain the greater intrusiveness of federal law, for the judicial choiceof-law balances to favor federal law or otherwise to become asymmetrical as between reverse-Eie and Erie. The operation of preemption by
itself adequately explains that greater intrusiveness.
2.

Troubling Symmetry Between Erie and Reverse-Eie

The relative intrusiveness of reverse-Erie, caused by locating conflict preemption (as in Brown and Dice) next to normal judicial balanc174 Cf Brown, 338 U.S. at 296 ("[A] federal right cannot be defeated by the forms
of local practice.").
175 See Dinh, supra note 32, at 2103-05. Compare Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138
(1988) (displacing the state's notice-of-claim statute for a federal civil rights case in
state court), withJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922-23 (1997) (refusing to displace the state's appealability doctrine for a federal civil rights case in state court).
Felderis a difficult read. See Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State
Courts, 54 BRooK. L. REv. 1057, 1066-70, 1093-94 (1989). Some commentators criticize Felder as going beyond the conflict-preemption precedents, but such criticism
fails to consider the case as a proper exercise of the judicial choice-of-law function.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at 450, 461-62. Although the state's notice-ofclaim statute did not conflict with the federal civil rights statute, there were strong
federal interests in favor of applying federal law in state court. Johnson, on the other
hand, provides an example of state procedural law applying in state court, while federal procedural law would apply on the same point in federal court.
176 See supra Part I.B.3.
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ing (as in Felder and Johnson), necessitated the foregoing discursion.
But in absolute terms, how much more intrusive is it than Erie?
a.

Similarity of the Doctrines

When all is said and done, the extent of the extra intrusion of
federal law into state courts, as compared to the intrusion of state law
into federal courts, is rather limited. 177 Reverse-Erie certainly does not
wholly displace state procedure.1 78 Generally, "federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them."'179 Moreover, the extra intrusion is not
at all discombobulating theoretically. To say that conflict preemption
can sometimes be intrusive is merely to observe that the Supremacy
Clause resolves conflicts between the sovereigns' laws in the federal
law's favor. Conflicting state law will fall, because no argument of
countervailing state interests can prevail. Thus, the reverse-Eie and
Erie doctrines are in fact not terribly disproportionate or ill-meshing.
So minimizing the discontinuities ironically raises the opposite
challenge of justifying the use in the reverse-Erie situation of methodologies that are very similar to Erie's approach. Indeed, it is not the
asymmetry that disturbs many observers, it is this remaining symmetry.
They think that the role of the Supremacy Clause in reverse-Erie

177 See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 125, § 4023, at 358 ("There is no apparent
formula to capture and define the decisions. At the same time, there is little reason to
suppose wholesale rejection of state procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will not become binding on state courts when they undertake to enforce federal
rights. The intrusions of federal procedure, although difficult to predict in detail, will
not be that pervasive."); Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1182-83; cf.Jackson, supra note 5,
at 133 ("It may be that lawyers' learning that 'you take the state courts as you find
them,' for the purposes of adjudicating federal claims, is, notwithstanding important
exceptions, so well established, that it does not occur to lawyers who have chosen to
litigate in state courts to seek the use of federal procedures. I am not aware of recent
evidence of a substantial problem of state court procedures (as compared to those in
federal courts) systematically interfering with the enforcement of federal rights.
(footnotes omitted)).
178 Wholesale displacement would be constitutionally troubling, see Hill, supra
note 5, at 413; supra note 14, but reverse-Erie stops well short of violating any anticommandeering or similar federalism principle that may exist as to state courts. Compare Bellia, supranote 16, at 970-92 (examining limits imposed by federalism in statelaw cases), with Redish & Sklaver, supra note 5, at 75-90 (examining broad federal
power to commandeer state courts from historical, textual, and political
perspectives).
179 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 508 (1954).
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should produce a very different doctrine from Erie.180 Why should
reverse-Erie resemble Erie at all?
Basically, Eie-like methodologies apply to reverse-Eie because,
despite the underlying principle of federal supremacy, the same notion of cooperative federalism applies in both situations, calling for
comity when one sovereign is enforcing the other's law. The problem
is the same. The only reason the reaches of state and federal laws, in
the converse settings, differ at all is that the underlying principle of
federal supremacy tilts the playing field for competing state and federal interests. Whenever state law and federal law directly collide, preemption applies. The contest is over. Federal law there reigns
supreme.
b.

Feedback Between the Doctrines

Erie ideas thus help to make sense of reverse-Erie. In state court,
the balancing methodology smooths, while it explains, the outer
reaches of preemption. On the one hand, in the setting that involves
a matter more of inference by judge than of implication by statute,
when state law would merely frustrate federal law, those Erie ideas provide refinement of how obstacle and field preemption should work:
whenever federal interests outweigh state interests in an Erie sense,
there should be preemption. On the other hand, as one goes even
farther into more independent judicial choice of law under reverseErie, the direct application of Erie ideas becomes easier and easier to
justify. There is, consequently, no real problem in adding Erie ideas to
preemption in this setting.
Conversely, there is no real problem with injecting preemption
ideas into traditional Erie theory. A few commentators acknowledge
the obvious fact that preemption analysis constitutes part of the Erie
doctrine in federal court too.18 1 Direct collisions between pertinent
federal law and state law will result in preemption of the state law in
federal court. In fact, Erie's judicial choice-of-law methodology actually works only as a backup to preemption. Consider Hanna as an
example. Its analysis is reassuringly similar to the reverse-Erie scheme.
The initial Hanna question is whether the state law directly collides
180 See, e.g., SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 156, at 111 ("Some teachers find objectionable the phrase 'reverse Erie,' as the doctrine has little to do with the federalism
concerns animating Erie and its progeny. Rather, the doctrine is a corollary of the
Supremacy Clause: it is sometimes necessary to force state courts to adopt federal
procedures in order to give effect to a federal substantive right.").
181 See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 751, 774 (1998)
(stressing that students cannot understand Erie without also studying preemption).
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with a Federal Rule: if so, the Federal Rule governs; if not, the judicial
choice-of-law methodology steps in as a backup.'8l
That is to say, in
both the Hanna and the reverse-Erie settings, in federal court and
state court respectively, a direct collision of federal and state law effectively results in preemption of the state law, but otherwise an accommodation of federal and state interests is necessary to determine
applicable law.
The bottom line is that reverse-Erie and Erie each entail the same
methodology of preemption as well as the same methodology of judicial choice of law. Their dual methodologies are the same, even if the
resulting reaches offederal and state laws differ because of the asymmetrical effect of the Supremacy Clause in the operation of the preemption
doctrine. Assuming that the Constitution, Congress, or binding precedent has not explicitly foreclosed the question of applicable law, the
federal court and the state court alike must determine if federal law
preempts state law. Outside the reach of preemption, the federal
court and the state court alike must make a choice of law in light of
competing federal and state interests.
3.

Soothing Summary of Erie and Reverse-Erie

This, then, is the reverse-Erie doctrine: federal law-be it constitutional, statutory, or common law-will apply pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the Constitution or Congress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever it preempts
state law or whenever it prevails by an Erie-like judicial choice of law.
This summary is not some wishfully radical proposal. Instead, its
aim is an accurate statement of the current law. If the state and federal laws directly collide, then the federal law preempts; if not, and
only if not, then the state courts must perform the federally mandated
accommodation of interests to choose the applicable law. That is, preemption and judicial choice of law are alternative routes to the
supremacy of federal law, not alternative routes to the application of
state law. If federal law applies, say, by express preemption, the courts
are not to second-guess the congressional dictate by some sort ofjudicial balancing. Only in the realm beyond preemption does judicial
choice of law have an independent role. In the middle zone of obstacle and field preemption, the accommodation of federal and state interests helps to concretize preemption: recall that whenever federal
182 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S, 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (applying state law), with id. at 468
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that FFD. R. Ov. P. 59 directly collides with and
preempts state law).
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interests overcome state interests in an Erie sense, there should be
such preemption. A benefit of this insight is to alleviate the difficulty
of preemption's obscure bounds. The increasing attention to accommodation of federal and state interests in that middle zone moots the
precise location of the outer boundary of preemption, as that boundary becomes an imperceptibly transitional zone in the middle of the
broad subject of reverse-Erie.
Once preemption and judicial choice of law thus find their adjacent places, the reverse-Erie and Erie doctrines become amenable to
productive comparison. Both doctrines involve determining the appropriate reach of state and federal laws. For each institutional
player, answering any such hitherto undecided choice-of-law question
should entail a consciousness of federal supremacy but often also
some sort of accommodation of interests. Thus, the two doctrines
share a basic similarity. They deserve to be studied together. They
should generate comparable intensities of debate, although they have
not.
Upon study, the Erie and reverse-Erie doctrines ultimately form a
logical and arguably optimal pattern, just as Judge Friendly suggested,1 83 with state law applying throughout our system where it
ought to apply and with federal law applying where it should apply to
federal and state players. To summarize the big picture of our legal
system, in areas of clear state "substantive" concern, state law governs
in both state and federal courts. As one moves into "procedural" areas, state law tends to govern in state court and federal law tends to
govern in federal court, but not always. Finally, as one moves into
areas of clear federal "substantive" concern, federal law governs in
both state and federal courts. The patterns of answers from Erie and
reverse-Erie are not all that different, and both dissimilarities and similarities are explicable and instructive.
Reverse-Erie, including preemption and judicial choice of law,
and Erie, including federal common law and other subdoctrines, in
fact turn out to be facets of the same problem. Resolving this overarching problem of the relationship between state and federal law requires a simultaneous consideration of the implications of these two
interlocking doctrines, a complicated process that nicely reflects the
complications of federalism itself.

183

See supra text accompanying note 162.
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SIGNIFICANCE

Signficance to the Country

The foregoing few pages' summary of the big picture rightly implies that the subject here is extraordinarily important, But it was a
long road to that brief summary. Accordingly, the importance of reverse-Erie, and sometimes even of Erie itself, is initially a bit mysterious
to people.
Additionally, most of the major Erie cases involve only a judicial
184
application of quasi-procedural state law in federal diversity cases.
Consequently, some people seem to view this subject as technical or
simply arcane. Others have characterized this view thus:
Erie has no meaning for cases outside diversity jurisdiction. Erie reflects the principle that the federal courts have an obligation to apply state law whenever their sole reason for hearing a dispute is to
provide a fair and impartial forum. Accordingly, the rule in Erie is
confined to diversity cases, where the only federal interest is in providing a forum free of interstate bias, and perhaps to certain ancillary and pendent claims, which the federal courts have no
independent interest in resolving and which are heard solely be185
cause of their connection with federal claims.
Such a view could not be more wrong. Those leading cases are the tail
of a humongous dog. We study mainly those tough major cases because they arose where the battle was waged-the difficult quasi-procedural issues in diversity when the higher lawmakers have been
silent-but the rationale of those cases controls in the infinitude of
more obvious cases.
Therefore, the same choice-of-law problem arises not only in diversity cases but in all other federal cases, as represented by the bottom row of my figure below. It also arises in all state cases. This
commonality is what this Article was about, and it explains how I could
say that reverse-Erie and Erie are facets of the same problem.
But that encapsulation makes vertical choice of law sound like a
problem only for the judiciary. Instead, it arises in all matters of lawmaking faced by the legislature and the executive, as well as by their
administrative agencies, as the next row of my figure tries to represent. Indeed, this problem was the main concern of the Framers
184 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 535 (1949);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
185 Peter Westen &Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REv. 311, 313 & n.9 (1980) (citing various sources as "representative
statements" of this view).
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in their task of creating a federal system by the Constitution, which is
after all a choice-of-law document. The government still performs this
task of allocating between state and federal law in its ordinary making
of law. If the Constitution made the choice between state and federal
law, its choice is binding. If it did not choose, then Congress, subject
to existing constitutional constraints, can make the binding choice.
Only if the Constitution and Congress (and its authorized delegates)
have not chosen, then the federal and state courts, as junior partners
in this endeavor, get to make the choice, acting by a judicially developed choice-of-law methodology that today operates well inside the
outer constitutional constraints and so can reflect the optimal relationship of state and federal law.
In turn, that description makes vertical choice of law sound like
solely a lawmaking problem of the government. Instead, our legal system imposes on all officials-and indeed on all persons living under it
and trying to apply the law, whether as lawyers or as other citizensthe problem of divining whether the government allocated a matter
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to state or federal law. So, these law-applying actors too must appear
in any figure representing the whole picture of reverse-Erie and Erie.
In sum, the simple fact is that every question of law posed to every
actor in a federal system such as ours is preceded by the choice-of-law
problem of whether the legal question is a matter of state or federal
law. "Every question of law" means all tasks of making or applying law
by every actor. "Every actor" means all public or private institutions
and persons-the private person in private affairs, the policeman on
the beat, the judge, the rulemaker, the legislator, the Framer. They
all must precede every legal decision or act with a choice-of-law process, that is, by first deciding whether federal or state law should govern. If a car driver or a police officer is trying to determine the speed
limit, that law-applier needs first to resolve whether state or federal
law governs by determining the choice that the Constitution, Congress, or courts have made or would make. Most often, in fact almost
always, the choice-of-law problem is very easy in light of a gross imbalance of competing interests, and so it has an intuitively clear answer.
Rarely, closer to the dividing line between state and federal law, the
resolution can be exquisitely difficult. The same goes for lawmakers,
although here too somebody higher in the hierarchy probably has already made the choice. Of course, the same goes for courts when
applying or making law, although the difficult cases will be much
more numerous and prominent for thei, as demonstrated by their
endless attention to the Erie doctrine over the years. In all events, the
choice-of-law problem is literally ubiquitous: the first step in any legal
18 6
act in our federal system is a vertical choice of law.
186 This problem of choosing between state and federal law appears to be inherent
in any of the many federal systems. Because federalism involves the people living
under the authority of more than one sovereign, such choice of law is inevitable. See
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. Rvv. 1, 49-59 (2002) (discussingJustice Kennedy's metaphor of federalism's splitting the atom of sovereignty);
cf David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1697, 1724-26 (2003) (extending the focus to
looser confederacies). Some interesting work on comparative federalism exists, such
as the work exploring the lessons that U.S. federalism may hold for the European
Union, despite the daunting difficulty of comparing at such a complexly fundamental
level. See, e.g.,
LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001); Larry Catd Backer, The Extra-National State: American ConfederateFederalism and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
173 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:
Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L, REv. 1612 (2002); cf
Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems,

90 VA. L. REv. 731, 817-27 (2004) (stressing instead the lessons of European federalism for the United States); Symposium, Federalism in the Americas... and Beyond (pts. I
& 2), 43 DuQ. L. REv. 517 (2005), 44 DuQ. L. Rev. 3 (2005) (treating federalism
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189 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
190 FED. R. EVID. 501.
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Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
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193 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
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In stark contrast, their express and thematic coverage of reverseErie is minimal. Seven casebooks do not really touch the doctrine.
Three others just mention it very briefly, not getting past the rule that
state courts might have to follow some federal procedure when hearing federal-law claims. 99 Three more casebooks go beyond bare mention to treat the doctrine lightly, mostly limiting their coverage to that
200
same rule.
Only the remaining five of the eighteen civil procedure
casebooks treat reverse-Erie at all seriously. Nevertheless, each of
201
these covers the subject in under ten pages.
L. Riv. 475 (2005), albeit with the odd purpose of criticizing them for their
failing to adopt what he sees as the obviously right view of the Erie methodology and
Mt-s

their going off instead for many pages in the wrong direction. Cf. Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a
Halfvay Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REx'. 963,
1015-16 (1998) (attributing the debate over Erie, with tongue partway in cheek, to
desires to inflict a law-school "rite of passage" on students and to get tenure, with the
effect of "misleading the courts and confusing our students"). I review the casebooks'
coverage of the topic of reverse-Erie, not to show that they disagree with my view, but
to demonstrate instead that the casebooks largely ignore the topic.
Incidentally, when civil procedure casebooks mention or treat reverse-Erie in a
thematic way, they do so always as part of their Erie coverage, usually as a comparative
note toward the end. So the pages given above for Erie coverage include any reverseErie coverage.
199 FREER & PERoUE, supranote 198, at 650 ("State courts must follow federal procedures 'essential to effectuate' the purposes behind the federal law." (quoting Dice
v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)); ROWE ET AL., Supra
note 198, at 615 ("To put the point more broadly if not with high precision, state
procedure can govern so long as it does not unduly burden the federal right-but if it
does, state courts hearing federal-law claims must follow federal procedure." (citing
Dice)); SULERMAN ET AL., supra note 198, at 572-73 (discussing Felder after observing
that "there are occasions when use of state procedure does not adequately vindicate
the federal right").
200 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supranote 198, at 287-89 (describing Dice, Felder,and Johnson
before concluding that "It] he combination of these three cases suggests that where a
state procedural rule neither burdens nor frustrates the attainment of the federal
statute's policies and objectives, and is not outcome determinative, the plaintiff who
chooses to enforce her federal claim in state court takes the state courts as she finds
them"); IDES & MAY, supra note 198, at 442, 522-25 (describing Dice and Felder after
saying that reverse-Erie analysis is much simplified compared to Erie because " [ i f state
procedural law actually conflicts with applicable and valid federal law, the state law
must give way"); PMA.NZss, supra note 198, at 337-38 (using the release-of-claim part of
Dice as a teaching case, and not reaching the "state procedures" problem).
201 FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 387-93 (using Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Dice, Brown; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt,
444 U.S. 490 (1980); and Felderasteaching cases); FRIDENT-HAL ET AL., supra note 198,
at 443-49 (using Dice); I-LzM ET AL., supra note 198, at 522-28 (using Dice); MARcus
ET AL.,

supra note 3, at 997-1005 (using Dice); TEPLY

ET AL.,

supranote 198, at 536-44
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It seems as if Erie and reverse-Erie should be either both in or
both out of any civil procedure course. We teachers are not looking at
Eriejust to see how to litigate in federal courts or how the federal side
of the system works. The aim today is to introduce the students to the
system of federalism, which includes two sides of a complex federalstate relationship. 202 Therefore, I would think that the modern civil
procedure course should cover both Erie and reverse-Erie.
2.

Federal Courts Courses

Nonetheless, most civil procedure casebooks are willing to leave
reverse-Eie to the federal courts course. 20 3 Unfortunately, most federal courts casebooks turn out not to view that doctrine as a real concern. Again, all eight current federal courts casebooks cover Erie,
treating it in greater depth by devoting about twice as many pages as
do civil procedure casebooks. 20 4 But one cannot rely on federal
courts casebooks to treat reverse-Erie with any seriousness.
Why not? Most of the federal courts casebooks naturally aim
their focus on federal courts and hence not on state courts, which is
consistent with the national law schools' usual ignoring of state courts,
(using Johnson). Representatively,
SEXTON

&

HELEN

HERSHKOFF,

JACK

H.

FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR

TEACHER'S

MANUAL

TO

R.

MILLER, JOHN

ACCOMPANY

JACK

E.
H.

E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCE98 (9th ed. 2005), remarks: "Although some might consider this topic to be

FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN
DURE

outside the first-year curriculum, we find it important to include some discussion of
Dice and the Supremacy Clause concerns that this subject raises."

202 See Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating TransnationalPerspectives into Civil Procedure:
1What Not to Teach, 56J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 5-7, on file
with the Notre Dame Law Review) (discussing pedagogic purposes of the first-year
course).
203 See THOMAS D. RowE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, TEACHER'S MANUAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 261 (2004) ("Best to leave any detailed examination of this
question to a more advanced course on Federal Courts.").
204 The coverage of applicable law in federal court is as follows: ROnERT N. CLINTON, RICHARD A. MATASAR & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, FEDERAL COURTS 697-814 (1996);
DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER, FEDERAL COURTS,
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 329-455 (3d ed, 2004); HOWARD P. FINK,

&
(2d ed. 2002);

LINDA S. MULLENIX, TH-OMAS D. RowE, JR.
T4E 21ST CENTURY 481-547

MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at

601-825; ARTHUR D. HELLMAN & LAUREN K. ROBEL, FEDERAL COURTS 465-681 (2005);
Low & JEmEs, supra note 117, at 2-32, 124-234; MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA
SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS 866-953 (5th ed. 2002); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JOHN B.
OAKLEY, FEDERAL COURTS 740-858 (11th ed. 2005).
Incidentally, when federal courts casebooks mention or treat reverse-Erie, they
usually do not do so as part of their Erie coverage. So the pages given above for Erie
coverage do not include any real reverse-Erie coverage.
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but which would be hard to explain if the books were seeking to relieve the students' ignorance of federalism. A closer look at the
books' structures suggests that they, perhaps assuming that civil procedure and constitutional law courses have provided an adequate introduction to the federal-state relationship, have other fish to fry. The
books' sketchy coverage of reverse-Erie typically comes not as part of
their Erie treatment but instead as part of their treatment of congressional power to control the courts. Specifically, reverse-Erie appears as
an addendum to the doctrine of Testa20 5 and Howlett,20 6 which deals
with the states' duty to entertain federal causes of action in the absence of a valid excuse. 20 7 Moreover, all the books skip preemption in
the main, leaving it to constitutional law courses. This pattern in the
books' coverage suggests that reverse-Erie is sneaking in as an attenuated aspect of separation of powers, rather than as a prominent fea208
ture of federalism.
Consequently, three of the federal courts casebooks do not even
touch the topic of reverse-Erie, except implicitly through brief treatment of the Testa-Howlett doctrine. 20 9 Four of the remaining five do
give actual attention to the reverse-Erie topic while maintaining a primary focus on Testa-Howlett, and some of them also give additional
mention to reverse-Erie where it arises incidentally in particular topics
2 10
such as civil rights actions or adequate state grounds.
205 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
206 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
207 Several commentators also approach reverse-Erie from the Testa-Howlett premise. See, e.g., DRAHOZAL, supra note 15, at 81-86. But cf. 16B WRIcHT ET AL., supra
note 125, § 4023 (exhibiting another but more complicated perspective, which entails
approaching the subject from the vantage of the adequate-and-independent-stategrounds limitation on Supreme Court review); Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1137-45
(same).
I myself find the more logical and less difficult way to view Testa-Howlett and reverse-Erie is in the opposite order, with the Testa-Howlett cases coming later as an aspect of the reverse-Erie preemption and judicial choice-of-law scheme that specifically
regards the governing law on issues of access to state court. See Jackson, supra note 5,
at 113-14.
208 See Mary Brigid McManamon, Challenging the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 27
CONN. L. REV. 833 (1995) (book review) (discussing purposes of federal courts
casebooks).
209 DOERNBERG ET AL., supra note 204, at 172, 582; FINK ET AL., supra note 204, at
243-51; WRIGHT & OAKLEY, supra note 204, at 483-91.
210 CLIN-rON ET AL., supra note 204, at 277-95, 901-06, 1385; HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 74, at 443-65, 564-65, 764-65; HELLMAN & ROBEL, supra note 204, at
195-222; REDisH & SHERRY, supra note 204, at 287-301, 983. Indeed, their actual
coverage of reverse-Erie, stricto sensu separate from Howlett-Testa, is not much lengthier
than that of the thorough civil procedure books. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 204, at
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unimportant appendage to preemption or some other doctrine, an
appendage that in the end requires little application of nonsubstantive federal law in state court. But if a fraction of the remaining commentators view reverse-Erie as a significant doctrine, if a few see it as a
more-or-less independent doctrine rather than as an appendage to
some other doctrine, if some see it as a more intrusive doctrine than
Erie while others view it as a less intrusive doctrine, then something is
wrong in the condition of commentary.
Commentators' development of any legal doctrine can be surprisingly contingent. A subject may remain remarkably undeveloped if it
falls into a curricular gap. An example would be the collateral bar
rule, an important doctrine of which many lawyers and professors are
ignorant, because it is not quite civil procedure and not quite consti2 13
tutional law, managing only to squeeze into some remedies courses.
133-34 (2d ed. 2003) (concluding very briefly in section entitled "State
Court Obligation" that state procedural law applies except where it discriminates
against federal substantive law). Those federal courts scholars who slight the subject
may be taking their cue from Professor Hart, who belittled the Brown and Dice cases.
While acknowledging that state procedures could not act to "nullify" federal rights, he
maintained that state courts had to apply only the federal rules of decision "in those
ERAL COURTS

respects which are important to the generality of people in everyday, pre-litigation
life." Hart, supra note 179, at 508; see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at 463.
Civil procedure treatises tend to leave reverse-Erie to federal courts books by ignoring it completely, see, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2005); GENE R.
SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2002), or
virtually, see, e.g., RICH-ARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.8, at 504
(2006); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &JOHN LEUBSDORF, CVIL PROCEDURE § 2.36, at 164 (5th ed. 2001), but more thorough coverage does appear in JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE

2005) (taking relatively broad view of reverse-Erie), and

§ 4.8 (4th ed.
supra note

TEPLY & WHITTEN,

117, at 518-20 (taking relatively narrow view).
Constitutional law treatises likewise tend to ignore reverse-Erie as a judicial
choice-of-law process, and so leave it to civil procedure and federal courts scholars,

J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
(2d ed. 1997) (three volumes); CHEMERNSKY, supra note 15; RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
see, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM

JOHN E. NOwAx, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1999) (five volumes), but
not always, as shown by the latest rendition of 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-7, at 321 n.61; id. § 6-38, at 1275-77 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
especially the implications of Felder).
213 The collateral bar rule authorizes punishment by criminal contempt for the
violation of a court order even though that order is judicially determined to have
been improper (no matter how serious the error, even for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or constitutional violation), although this doctrine authorizes such punishment only if the violator was personally bound and had an opportunity to pursue full
review of the order without incurring destruction of a significant right in question.
See generally John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order
After Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 215 (2002) (explaining the collateral bar rule
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For reverse-Erie, civil procedure courses tend to leave it to federal
courts, a course whose interests actually take its coverage off in a different direction.2 14 Compounding the problem, civil procedure tends
even more predominantly to leave preemption to constitutional law, a
course that at least until recently left preemption as one of its lesserworked topics.

2 15

Moreover, the guise of any doctrine depends on the viewer's
point of departure from some established topic. It seems that scholars
and suggesting how lower courts should interpret existing Supreme Court
precedent).
214 A course that sometimes does a better job is conflicts. Some of its more thorough casebooks not only treat Erieas a choice-of-law doctrine but reach some of TestaHowlett and reverse-Ei'e toward the end of the book. See, eg,, DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA
HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 760-83 (7th ed.
2006) (treating preemption and reverse-Erie together for the first time in this new
edition); GARvJ. SIMsoN, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT Or LAws 847-57 (4th
ed. 2005). But conflicts treatises do not touch on reverse-Erie and so suggest that it is
not a topic of active interest within conflicts courses. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN &
WILLIAm L. REYNOLoS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 2002); EUGENE F.
SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICRJ. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(3d ed. 2000); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th
ed. 2001). But see LUTHER L. McDOuGAL, III, ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN,

AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 63, at 255 (5th ed. 2001) ("However in an unusual line of
decisions, the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that federal law can
also sometimes preempt state procedural law."). Of course, some conflicts scholars,
perhaps prompted by their other curricular interests, bring their expertise on methodology to bear profitably on reverse-Erie in occasional articles. See supra note 7. But
cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REv.
2448, 2493 (1999) (saying that conflicts scholars give preemption "little attention").
In fact, all law courses entail the Erie megadoctrine, but most do not focus on it.
Consider criminal law. Considerable federal procedural law applies in state criminal
cases, and some state law applies in federal criminal cases. Compare, e.g., Arizona v.
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 250 (1981) (applying state appeal law in removed state
criminal case against federal officer), with, e.g., City of Aurora v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295,
300 & n.10 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying incidents of federal jury procedure in a removed criminal case). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydrain Government":
FederalRecourse to State Law in Crime Fighting,86 B.U. L. REv. 65 (2006) (discussing the
interrelation between state and federal criminal law). But because these occurrences
are either obvious or rare, and because state and federal subject matter jurisdictions
do not usually overlap in the sense of one sovereign's prosecuting crimes under the
other's laws, criminal law courses and scholars can afford to neglect Erie. They cannot
afford, however, to deny its relevance, as the court did in United States v. Powers, 482
F.2d 941,943 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Erie has no application whatsoever to federal criminal
prosecutions.").
215 Cf Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
768 (1994) ("Although as a topic, preemption has largely been ignored by constitutional law scholars, it is almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitutional law in practice." (footnotes omitted)).
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who take a narrow view of reverse-Erie come at it from certain angles.
For federal courts scholars, the usual jumping-off point for approaching reverse-Erie is Testa-Howlett.2 1 6 This narrow focus on congressional
control of court access would tend to produce a pinched view of reverse-Erie. For constitutional law scholars, the usual jumping-off point
is preemption. 217 They consequently tend to think primarily of the
relatively restrained preemption of state substantive law by congressional statute, and their myopia works to obscure that reverse-Erie can
be more intrusive than Erie.
In sum, reverse-Erie is on the radar screen of relatively few scholars. Of them, not enough use Erie as the departure point. Moreover,
virtually no law-school course combines study of reverse-Erie with preemption. Thus, scholars and teachers tend not to observe, no less explain, why reverse-Erie is in a sense more intrusive than Erie. Nor do
they tend to perceive that reverse-Erie is the critical missing piece in
the big puzzle of the relationship between state and federal law. All
this appears to constitute the best, albeit unsatisfying, explanation of
its neglect.
CONCLUSION

The simple truth is that every question of law posed to every actor
in a system of federalism is preceded by the choice-of-law problem of
whether the legal question is a matter of state or federal law, a problem whose resolution is usually obvious but sometimes excruciatingly
difficult.
This ubiquitous truth prevails in state court. The sorely neglected doctrine of reverse-Erie provides that federal law-be it constitutional, statutory, or common law-will apply pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the Constitution or Congress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever that federal
216

See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Such views may influence certain
COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTAL, ARTHUR R.
MILLER &JOiN E. SEXTON, CMIL PROCEDURE 455-62 (8th ed. 2001) (using Testa as
well as Dice as teaching cases); cf FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 198 (omitting Testa
in that casebook's most recent edition).
217 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. For example, even though Professor
Chemerinsky provides an excellent discussion of preemption in his constitutional law
treatise, CHEMRRINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.2, he makes no mention of reverse-Elie
there. When he reaches the latter subject in his federal courts treatise, CHMERINSKY,
supra note 13, § 3.5, his constitutional law interest influences the narrow scope he
gives to reverse-Erie. Such views may influence certain civil procedure books too. See,
e.g., SILBERMAN & STEIN, supra note 156, at 111-12 (going from preemption approach
to narrow view of reverse-Erie).

civil procedure books too. See, e.g., JOHN J.
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law preempts state law or, as less frequently acknowledged, prevails by
an Erie-like judicial balancing. If the state and federal laws directly
collide, then the federal law preempts; if not, then the state courts
must perform the federally mandated balancing of governmental interests to determine the applicable law.
This understanding of reverse-Erie constitutes a heretofore missing but significant piece of the pervasive and puzzling problem of vertical choice of law. Fitting it with all of the other pieces of the puzzle
helps to reveal the true relationship between state and federal law. It
interlocks with and ultimately merges into the overall Erie scheme to
form a logical pattern, in which not only the state and federal courts
but also all the other institutional and private actors can weigh state
and federal interests to shape or implement the optimal relationship
of state and federal law in our legal life.

